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Articles

Pre-trial Sanctions: An Empirical Study

Florrie Young Roberts*

This Article presents the results of an empirical study of pretrial sanctions in the Central District of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court. The study specifically examined motions for
monetary sanctions brought under the Discovery Act of 19861
[Discovery Act] and section 128.5 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. The purpose of this study is to isolate and analyze a
representative sample of pre-trial motions for sanctions and the
judicial response to these requests. The findings illustrate, among
other things, the following: (1) the frequency of motions for
sanctions; (2) the amounts of sanctions requested and awarded on
a total, average, and hourly rate basis; (3) a breakdown of sanctions
requests and awards under the various discovery statutes; (4) a
breakdown of sanction requests and awards under Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.5; (5) a breakdown of sanction awards by
individual judges; (6) the differences between sanctions issued in
the Fast Track courts and the Slow Track courts; and (7) on a less
serious side, the sanctioning pattern according to different days of
the week. This Article concludes with some thoughts on the proper
use and amount of sanctions.

Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; A.B. 1971, Stanford University; J.D.
1974, University of Southern California.
1. CAL CV. PRoc. CODE §§ 2016-2036 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
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Commentators frequently call for greater use of monetary
sanctions as a deterrent to discovery and other pre-trial abuse.2
However, no study has been previously conducted in California,
and only one has taken place in the federal courts which surveyed
pre-trial motions to determine the use of sanctions and present
findings.3 This is the first study of its kind analyzing the
sanctioning patterns of California Superior Court judges.
I. METHODOLOGY

By necessity, any meaningful study of this type must be
conducted at the trial court level with an examination of actual trial
court files. Because motions granting or denying sanctions
generally are not reviewed by the appellate courts, very few cases
involving sanctions become the subject of appellate court
decisions.4 Therefore, the data for this study was gathered directly
from trial court files by reading and analyzing the moving and
opposing papers and the resulting court minute orders. The motions
were examined, briefed, and computerized. All information was
derived from files and court records available to the public.

2.
See, e.g., Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A JudicialPerspective,67 CAW'. L REV. 264,
271 (1979); Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse: Sanctioning Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the CaliforniaCode of Civil Procedure,21 SANTA CLARA L REv. 567, 611 (1981);
Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New FederalRules: On the Limited
Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L REv. 680 (1983); Comment, The Sanctioning Provision of
the Mew CaliforniaCivil Discovery Act, Section 2023: Will It Make a Difference or Is It JustAnother
"Paper Tiger,"? 15 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 401 (1988); Comment, The California Discovery Act of
1986: Discovery the New Fashioned Way, 18 Sw. U. L REV.233, 247, 249 (1989).
3.
Connolly, Judicial Controlsand the Civil Litigative Process:Discovery, Federal Judicial
Center (1978). This study was conducted in 1978 and involved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.
Unfortunately, the study isolated only 67 motions for sanctions out of its case window of discovery
motions. In 75% of these 67 cases, the sanction was granted and in 25% itwas denied. As shown
in Part liA, infra, California Superior Court Judges face significantly more sanction requests.
4. Until recently, motions granting or denying sanctions were not considered rinal
judgments
reviewable by appeal. Rather, the decisions were reviewable only by a discretionary writ of mandate,
which was rarely granted. However, a recent statute provides that sanction awards in excess of $750
may be reviewed on an appeal. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(k) (West Supp. 1991).
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A. Sample
1. Motions Studied
This study involved a complete survey of all motions ruled on
in the Los Angeles Superior Court, Central District, from May 15,
1989, through July 15, 1989. This time frame will be hereinafter
referred to as the "study window."
The study window of two months, or forty-three working days,
was large enough to provide a representative sample of judges'
ruling patterns without expanding the data beyond control. Because
the Central District is the busiest court in California, the study
window contained thousands of ruled-upon motions which had to
be reviewed. Of those reviewed, 813 were identified as involving
pre-trial sanctions under the Discovery Act or Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.5. Of these, 516 were isolated as
"studiable" because they contained enough information to
contribute to the study's results.
Motions qualified as "studiable" if they were within the study
window and contained the following: (1) The complete
memorandum of points and authorities; (2) a declaration setting
forth supporting facts, and the amount of the monetary sanction
requested by the moving party;5 and (3) the trial court's ruling in
the form of a minute order.
The remaining 297 cases were excluded after review for the
following reasons:
-20 cases were dismissed with no ruling on monetary sanctions;
-40 cases were taken off calendar and subsequently decided outside the
study window;
-125 cases had incomplete files, missing either the minute order
indicating the court's ruling or the moving party's required points and
authorities and declaration;

5.
If submitted, the memorandum of points and authorities and the declaration of the
opposing party were also examined.
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-112 cases involved lost files which, after repeated extensive searches,
could not be located anywhere in the Los Angeles Superior Court
Records, Archives Departments, or individual courtrooms. 6

These figures are demonstrated in the following graph:
APPORTIONMENT OF TOTAL MOTIONS INVOLVING SANCTIONS

Sanctions Awardod

Studiablo Motions

Sanctions Denied

Incomplete File

Disposition

Number

Percent

Studiable Motions

516

63.5%

Monetary Sanctions Awarded

277

34.1%

Monetary Sanctions Denied

239

29.4%

Incomplete File

125

15.4%

Lost File

112

13.8%

Off Calendar

40

4.9%

Dismissed

20

2.4%

6. The problem of lost files was the topic of an article in a local legal periodical, which
quoted the Superior Court Records Management Services Department as saying that "fewer than I
percent of 430,000 to 450,000 files stored at the County Courthouse are missing each year." Most
of the missing files are -buried under stacks on a clerk's desk or in a judge's chambers.' Blum,
OccasionalLoss ofa Court File Can Be FrustratingForLawyers, Los Angeles Daily Journal, July
10, 1990, § 2, at 1, col. 1. However, the experiences gleaned from conducting this study suggest that
the problem is much more widespread.
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2. Judges
Every judge in the Central District of Los Angeles County
Superior Court who heard one or more motions involving pre-trial
sanctions during the study window period became a part of the7
study. For purposes of analyzing the actions of individual judges,
only judges who heard five or more motions were considered. In
this category, twenty-three Fast Track Judges and five Slow Track
Judges, including two who regularly hear only Law and Motion
matters, were surveyed.
B. Data Gathering
Superior court records are not computerized. Nor are any
compilations kept according to the subject matter of motions ruled
upon. Therefore, the initial problem faced in conducting the study
was identifying the relevant motions. The sheer magnitude of files
and the associated difficulty in tracking files through the
unautomated court system in Los Angeles required a widespread
effort. The process of gathering data was accomplished through the
following steps."
1. Superior Court Clerk Identification
Initially, cases involving motions for sanctions during the study
window were identified by court personnel by case number from
minute orders. This task was performed by the supervisors of the
individual courtroom clerks who, as part of their daily duties,
review all minute orders written by the judges. If the minute order
indicated that a pre-trial sanction involving discovery or
section 128.5 had been requested, the supervisor would note the
case number. Once identified by case number, the files could be

7.

See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (discussing the patterns of awards on

motions for pretrial sanctions granted by judges who were analyzed in this study).
8. The cooperation of the personnel of the Los Angeles County Superior Court was willingly
given and greatly appreciated.
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pulled from the filing area and examined. Unfortunately, many of
the motions identified in this way were found not to involve
sanctions or to involve sanctions initiated by the court and
unrelated to the study.9 Also, there was inconsistency in the
reporting by the supervising clerks and the volume of cases
eventually began to burden them. This necessitated the
development of an alternative method for identification of files.
2. Review of Logs in Calendarand Minutes Department
In order to preserve the accuracy of the study and ensure that
all relevant motions were identified, it became necessary to
personally review the logs in the Calendar and Minutes Department
during the study window. The department's records contain a
description of all calendared motions and copies of all minute
orders from the civil trial courts. From this examination, the 813
cases related to pre-trial sanctions heard during the study window
were identified.
3. Examination of Court Files
All data used in the study was gathered directly from the court
files by reading the moving and opposing papers and the court
minute order. Examination of the actual court records used in the
study began during development of the master list of 813 cases
related to pre-trial sanctions. The files were examined in random
order, as retrieved by the file clerks.
Many requests to the Records Department for files were
routinely returned as "checked out" to the courtrooms. A random
sample of 328 case files was obtained. These motions were fully
briefed for purposes of the study by noting the judge presiding,
department, date of motion, type of motion, reason for request,
code sections relied upon, amount requested, time specified,

9. The most common example was sanctions imposed for violation of the time standards and
deadline requirements of the Fast Track rules under the Rules of the Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles § 1109 (Dec. 1989).
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response, resulting ruling, and reasons given by the judge for the
ruling if stated in the minute order.
The full briefing of 328 requests for sanctions involved
significant time. With 485 remaining motions to be examined and
with a large sample of 328 fully briefed motions completed, it was
decided to examine the remaining motions in a more streamlined
fashion. Thus, the remaining 485 files were examined by noting the
judge presiding, department, date of motion, type of motion, code
sections ruled upon, amount requested, time specified, and the
resulting ruling. This eliminated a full briefing of the conduct cited
as the reason for the motion, the response to the motion, and the
reasons stated by the judge.
4. Computerization of Briefs
With an eye toward facilitating later searches through the data,
the briefs were entered into a database developed for this study.
The database fields were designed to match those specified in the
briefs, thereby allowing searches by code section, judge, amount
requested, time expended, and outcome of motion. This made
manipulation of the data for the 813 briefs easy to manage and
present in a custom-designed report format and eliminated the use
of a cumbersome tallying process normally associated with this
type of research. It also insured greater accuracy in the data
analysis results.
II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF STUDY

Once the briefing was completed and the data was
computerized, the analysis of the data through computer searches
was accomplished. While all 813 cases were entered into the
database, calculations were performed using only the 516 studiable
motions. The data analysis was divided into the following
categories and is summarized in this section. A more detailed
analysis is set forth in Part IHI.
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A. Yearly Forecasts
This section uses the total number of motions for sanctions
filed during the study window and a hypothetical amount of
judicial time expended per motion to project yearly totals. It is
estimated that the Central District faces at least 4,878 motions for
pre-trial sanctions per year and expends at least 2,439 hours of
judicial time on pre-trial motions for sanctions.
B. GeneralAnalysis of Studiable Motions
All of the studiable motions were analyzed together and were
not segregated by code section or judge. The results of this section
of the study can be summarized as follows:
Total Studiable Motionst'
Motions (studiable) in which sanctions
were requested
Number in which sanctions were awarded
Number in which sanctions were denied
Total amount of sanctions requested"
Total amount of sanctions awarded
Percent awarded of amount requested
Average amount of sanctions requested
Total hours billed
2
Average billing rate requested1

516
277 or 53.7%
239 or 46.3%
$830,149
$228,387
27.5%
$1,608
3,107
$138

10. These figures include all motions, including those in which sanctions were denied.
11. This amount includes attorneys* fees and related costs.
12. This amount represents total hours billed for all categories (3,107) divided into the total
dollar amount of attorneys' fees (excluding costs) requested where the moving attorney segregated
fees from costs and specified the number of attorney hours expended ($427,944). See infra page 21
(discussing the above calculation).
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Motions In Which Sanctions Were Awarded13
Number in which sanctions were awarded
Total amount of sanctions requested
Total amount of sanctions awarded
Average amount of sanctions requested 14
Average amount of sanctions awarded15
Percent awarded of amount requested
Average billing rate requested 6
Average billing rate awarded 7
Motions in which amount of sanctions awarded
equalled amount requested
Percentage of total motions
Percentage of successful motions
Average amount of sanctions when awarded
without reduction
Average billing rate when awarded
without reduction
Motions in which sanctions awarded but amount
awarded was less than amount requested
Percentage of total motions
Percentage of successful motions
Average amount of sanctions requested
Average amount of sanctions awarded
Percent awarded of amount requested
Average billing rate requested
Average billing rate awarded'

277
$333,134
$228,387
$1,203
$825
68.6%
$135
$100

140
27.1%
50.5%
$911
$122

130
25.2%
46.9%
$1,549
$720
46.5%
$146
$80

13. These figures do not include the motions in which sanctions were denied.
14. This figure represents the average of the successful motions only. The total amount
(requested or awarded) was divided by the 277 successful motions.
15. This figure represents the average of the successful motions only. The total amount
(requested or awarded) was divided by the 277 successful motions.
16. This figure is computed from those successful motions in which the attorneys in their
moving papers segregated the amount requested in attorneys' fees and specified the number of hours
billed. ($231,612 in billable time divided by 1,716 hours).
17. The lowest calculable amount was $99 an hour and the highest was $105. The allocation
method produces a billable rate of $100. See infra pages 22-23 for a description of these methods.
18. The lowest calculable billing rate awarded in this category was $77 and the highest was
$84. The allocation method produced a billing rate awarded of $80. See infra pages 22-23 for a
description of these methods.
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Motions in which sanctions awarded and amount
awarded was greater than amount requested
Percentage of total motions
Percentage of successful motions
Average amount of sanctions requested
Average amount of sanctions awarded
Percent awarded of amount requested
Average billing rate requested
Average billing rate awarded 9

7
1.4%
2.5%
$608
$1,035
170.3%
$112
$191-$211

Motions in Which Sanctions Were Denied
Motions in which no sanctions awarded and
substantive motion was denied
Percentage of total motions
Percentage of unsuccessful motions
Average total amount of sanctions requested
Average billing rate requested

122
23.6%
51%
$2,868
$146

Motions in which no sanctions awarded but
substantive motion was granted
Percentage of total motions
Percentage of unsuccessful motions
Average total amount of sanctions requested
Average billing rate requested

117
22.7%
49%
$1,257
$136

19. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the total billable hours reported in
motions in which sanctions were awarded and the average hourly billable rate request).
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C. Fast Track v. Slow Track Breakdown
This section analyzes the judges' sanctioning patterns by their
respective assignments to the Fast Track or the Slow Track.2" The
results can be summarized as follows:
Fast Track Totals:
Number of motions heard
Percentage of total motions
Number in which sanctions were awarded
Total amount of sanctions requested
Total amount of sanctions awarded
Percent awarded of amount requested
Average amount of sanctions requested2'
Average amount of sanctions awarded
Average billing rate awarded"

192
38.8%
119 or 62%
$224,528
$91,070
40.6%
$1,169
$765
$106

In motions where sanctions were granted,

At the time of the study, the "Fast Track" was a name commonly used by the Los
20.
Angeles County Superior Court for a pilot project pursuant to the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act
of 1986, CAL. Gov'T CODE, §§ 68600-68619 (West 1989). Trial Delay Reduction Rules were
incorporated under Chapter 11 of the Rules of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. The
Fast Track cases had an expedited pre-trial schedule with shortened mandatory deadlines. The Los
Angeles County Superior Court adopted the case disposition standards recommended by the American
Bar Association and adopted by the Judicial Council. The goal as of July 1, 1991, was to dispose of
90% of all civil cases within one year of filing, 98% within 18 months, and 100% within 2 years.
Rule 1100.4 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court Rules (1990).
Half of the cases filed in the Central District and half of the pending cases were assigned to the
Fast Track based on whether the case number was odd or even. Cases assigned to the Fast Track
were controlled by individual calendaring judges who would preside at the trial and who also heard
all motions related to the case.
Cases not assigned to the Fast Track were heard and disposed of under the regular time
parameters, although guidelines were established under Chapter 12 of the Rules of the Superior Court
for the County of Los Angeles. Cases not on the Fast Track are called "Slow Track" for lack of a
better term. The Slow Track courts received cases on the master calendar system. These courts
utilized the Law and Motion departments to hear pre-trial motions and different judges to conduct
the trial.
The Central District has adopted new rules for cases filed on or after January 1, 1991. Cases
will still be divided between "Individual Calendar" and -Master Calendar Judges," but all cases
now have the same mandatory expedited deadlines. Rules 1300 et seq. of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court Rules (1991).
21. This average includes the motions in which sanctions were denied.
22. This average includes successful motions only.
23. The lowest calculable billing rate awarded was $104 per hour and the highest was $114
per hour. The $106 rate was calculated under the allocation method. See infra pages 22-23 for a
description of these calculations.
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the percent awarded of amount requested?'

Slow Track Totals:
Number of motions heard
Percentage of total motions
Number in which sanctions were awarded
Total amount of sanctions requested
Total amount of sanctions awarded
Percent awarded of amount requested 2S
Average amount of sanctions requested
Average amount of sanctions awarded26
Average billing rate awarded
In motions where sanctions were granted,
the percent awarded of amount requested

74.2%

303
61.2%
149 or 49.2%
$582,062
$136,284
23.4%
$1,921
$915
$93

D. Judges Breakdown
This section focuses separately on each judge. The following

were examined: the number of motions for monetary sanctions
heard by the judge, the percentage of time the judge awarded
sanctions (called the average), the total amount of sanctions
requested, the total amount of sanctions awarded, and a "slugging
percentage," which indicates the percent of sanctions awarded out
of the amount of sanctions requested when the judge granted a
motion for sanctions.29 The following is an example:

24. This is the "slugging percentage" described in Part ID, infra.
25. This average includes the motions in which sanctions were denied.
26. This average includes successful motions only.
27. The lowest calculable billing rate awarded was $90 per hour and the highest was $99 per
hour. The $93 rate was calculated under the allocation method. See infra pages 22-23 and
accompanying text for a description of these calculations.
28. This is the "slugging percentage" described infra note 86 and accompanying text.
29. The "slugging percentage is described infra note 86 and accompanying text.

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An Empirical Study
Judge Who Most Frequently Awarded Sanctions:
Judge 2 of the Fast Track:
-6 motions heard
-5 motions granted
-$2,740 in sanctions requested
-$2,326 in sanctions awarded
-Average - 0.833
-Slug. - 1.000
Judges Who Least Frequently Awarded Sanctions:
Judge 23 of the Fast Track
-5 motions heard
-0 motions granted
-$12,572 in sanctions requested
-$ 0,000 in sanctions awarded
-Average - 0.000
-Slug. - 0.000
Judge E of the Slow Track
-113 motions heard
-41 motions granted
-$257,109 in sanctions requested
-$31,882 in sanctions awarded
-Average - 0.363
-Slug. - 0.409
E. Discovery Act Breakdown
This section focuses on sanctions requested and awarded for

violations of various provisions of the Discovery Act. It analyzes

the code sections cited as authority by the moving parties 0 and
shows the success rates when cited.

30. Because more than one codc was often argued per motion, there were 809 citations in 473
motions which relied in part or in full on Discovery Act provisions. Forty-three (43) motions relied
solcly on Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5 as authority and did not cite a discovery code section.
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In summary, the individual
code sections were cited in the
31

study cases as follows:

Number
of Times

Number
of Times

Cited

Successful

-2017 (general discovery)
-2019 (methods of discovery)
-2025 (deposition)
-2030 (interrogatories)
-2031 (document inspection)
-2032 (physical and mental exams)
-2033 (requests for admissions)
-2034 (expert witnesses)

F. Utilization of Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5
This section analyzes the composition and disposition of
motions where Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 was relied
upon for the imposition of sanctions for non-discovery matters, and
also where it was cited in support of discovery sanctions. The study
produced eighty-five motions that cited section 128.5, forty-three
of which did not involve discovery.

31. The general sanctions provision, Code of Civil Procedure § 2023, which applies to all
types of discovery, was utilized 315 times. See CAL. Ctv. PRoc. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1991).
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G. Days Of The Week Breakdown
This section attempts to shed light on the question of which day
of the week is most advantageous to bring a motion for sanctions.
Although no correlation is claimed, the statistics were computed
out of interest. The greatest number of motions for sanctions during
the study window were set for hearing on Wednesdays, but the
highest success rate in terms of the percentage of motions granted
occurred on Tuesdays. The day on which the greatest percentage
of motion requests were taken off calendar was Friday.
I1. DETAILED RESULTS OF STUDY

A. Yearly Projections
In a two-month period, judges in the Los Angeles Superior
Court, Central District, faced 81332 motions for pre-trial sanctions.
If this figure is multiplied by six to reach a yearly total, 3 the
number of motions involving pre-trial sanctions heard in the
Central District each year can be estimated at 4,878.
This figure leads to several conclusions. First, attorneys
apparently perceive that their adversaries have engaged in conduct
which not only violates pre-trial rules but does so in a fashion that
is sanctionable because it is "without substantial justification" '
or is in "bad faith," "frivolous," or "for the purpose of
delay."93 5 In other words, these are not good faith differences of
opinion but rather are disputes where the moving party feels the
adversary has acted in an unsupportable fashion. Additionally, since
all of the discovery provisions require the parties to attempt to

32. As explained supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text, 297 motions were excluded from
the sample to obtain the 516 studiable motions. However, this does not diminish the total number of
sanctions motion filed. Some cases were not actually heard by the judge because they were taken off

calendar.
33.
34.
35.

Of course, this type of extrapolation can only provide an estimate.
See, e.g., CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1991).
Id at § 128.5 (West Supp. 1991).
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resolve their differences informally, 6 this figure indicates that
attorneys practicing in the Central District of Los Angeles are
unable to do so almost 5,000 times per year.
Second, the number of requests for sanctions is significant from
the standpoint of expenditure of judicial resources. As a very rough
estimate, the average judge spends at the minimum thirty minutes
per motion in the form of a combination of off-the-bench
preparation time, actual hearing time, and decision-making time. If
4,878 motions per year are hypothesized, then 2,439 hours of
judicial time are expended on issues where the attorneys are unable
to resolve their pre-trial disputes themselves and one or both of
them feel the other's conduct is so egregious as to warrant
sanctions.
B. GeneralAnalysis of Studiable Motions
Of the 813 cases identified during the study window, 516 were
determined to be studiable17 Most of the computations utilized
the 516 studiable motions as the sample. For all hourly rate
computations performed in the study, a smaller sample of motions
was used. In each category, only motions in which the attorney
specifically segregated fees from costs and specified his billable
hours were considered. Motions in which the attorney made general
lump sum requests for sanctions that covered both fees and costs,
or where the attorney did not detail the hours of attorney time
expended, were excluded from these computations." An analysis
of the motions reveals the following statistics.

36. Id at §§ 2017(d), 2019(b)(2), 2023(a)(9), 2025(i), 2030(e), (1), 2031(e), 2032(c)(7),
2033(e), (1), 2034(e), (1) (West Supp. 1991).
37. For an explanation of which motions were "studiablc," ° see supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying texL
38. Because different categories contained different numbers of motions where attorneys
segregated fees, costs, and billable hours, the sample sizes differ.
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1. Totals
Sanctions were awarded in 277 or 53.7% of the 516 studiable

motions. Sanctions were denied in 239 or 46.3% of the motions.
The total amount of monetary sanctions requested over the twomonth period was $830,149. 3' The average request was $1,608.
The total amount of sanctions awarded was $228,387, or 27.5% of
the amount requested, for a 72.5% reduction.
These figures are demonstrated in the following graphs.
A COMPARISON OF SANCTIONS AWARDED AND DENIED

239 Cases (46.3%)

D

Legend
Sanctions Denied
Sanctions Awarded

277 Cases (53.7%)

39. Six very large requests totalling $182,929 are included in this figure. These requests were
in the amount of $54,900, $59,708, $24,715, $14,362 (in the category of substantive motion denied
and motion for sanctions denied); $21,842 (in the category of motion for sanctions granted and
amount awarded equalled the amount requested); and $27,402 (in the category of motion for
sanctions granted and amount awarded reduced (in this case to $800)). Only two of these large
requests resulted in a sanction award. All of these requests were general requests in that the moving
attorneys did not differentiate between fees and costs.
40. This average is the result of dividing the total amounts requested of $830,149 by the total
number of motions of 516. This average should be distinguished from the average requested for
successful motions of $1,203. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text (discussing the amounts
requested and the monetary awards in successful motions for sanctions).
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A COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT REQUESTED AND
THE TOTAL AMOUNT AWARDED

0,
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......
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$300,000.00.
$200,000.00.
$100,000.00.
$0.00

tal Amount Requested

Total Amount Awarded

Total Amount Requested

$830,149

Total Amount Awarded

$228,387

Percent Awarded

27.5%

a. Time Expended
In the category of total studiable motions, the moving parties
reported 3,107 hours of work necessitated by their motions. This
number is from 420 cases (81% of the cases studied) where the
moving party reported the number of hours expended in seeking
the sanction and differentiated between fees and costs. The average
hours expended per motion based on these numbers was 6.5 hours.
In ninety-six cases the attorneys did not specify the hours
expended or differentiate fees from costs. Instead, the moving

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An EmpiricalStudy
parties either requested "reasonable attorney's fees" and left the
amount of sanctions to the court or asked for a certain amount
under the label of "reasonable attorney's fees." If these cases are
included in the sample and multiplied by the average number of
hours expended of 6.5 hours, the total hours expended by the
moving parties would amount to 3,731. Additionally, if the 125
incomplete cases and the 112 lost cases were included and
computed in the sample, the total hours necessitated by motions for
41
sanctions would rise to 5,272 hours.
The common categories of attorney time and the percentage of
time devoted to each category was as follows:42
Preparation of motion

59.9%

Appearance time

29.5%

Travel time

4.0%

Conferring with opposing counsel
Preparation of reply

2.9%
2.5%

Secretarial

1.2%

41. The opposing party, while not tracked for this study when unsuccessful, nonetheless has
reported hours that could double the total hours expended.
42. These were the categories described by the moving parties. Some overlap may occur. For
example, travel time may incorporate some portion of the appearance time category depending on
how the moving party presented its breakdown.

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
This breakdown of time is illustrated in the following graph:
ALLOCATION OF ATroRNEYs' TIME

Research / Prep 59.9%

Appear 29.5%

Disposition

Percentage

Hours

Research/Prep of Motion

59.9%

1861.2

Appear

29.5%

916.6

Travel

4.0%

124.5

Interaction with Opponent

2.9%

90.2

Preparation of Reply

2.5%

77

Secretarial

1.2%

37.5

b. Total Amount Requested in Fees
Of the 420 cases where attorneys in their moving papers
specified the hours billed and differentiated between fees and costs,
a total amount of fees of $427,944 was requested. Of course, the
actual amount of attorney's fees requested was significantly higher
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because many attorneys did not differentiate between fees and costs
in their moving papers. This is evident from the fact that $830,149
in total sanctions was requested.43 However, for purposes of
computing the hourly rate requested, it was necessary to use the
$427,944 figure.
c. Hourly Rate Requested
Attorneys requested an average hourly rate of $138. This figure
was computed by dividing the total amount of attorneys' fees
specifically requested ($427,944) by the total amount of attorneys'
time specifically reported (3,107 hours).
2. Successful Motions for Monetary Sanctions
Sanctions were awarded in 277 or 53.7% of the 516 cases
where monetary sanctions were requested." In these 277 motions,
a total of $333,134, or an average of $1,203 per motion was
requested.45 The courts awarded $228,387, or an average of $825
per motion.4" This was 68.6% of the amount requested or a 31.4%
reduction.47
a. Hourly Rate Requested
Of the $333,134 in sanctions requested by the moving parties
in the successful motions, the total amount for reported billable
time was $231,612. This figure was computed by adding the total

43. As mentioned above, attorneys did not differentiate between fees and costs in 96 cases.
In those cases, they requested $267,382 in general requests that were not allocated between fees and
costs.
44. Of course, the substantive motion was also granted.
45. These figures include both fees and costs.
46. These figures include both fees and costs.
47. If two large requests of $21,842 and $27,402 are excluded from the successful category,
the total requested drops to $283,890 and the average successful request drops to $1,032. Removing
these requests from the $228,387 awarded results in a total amount awarded of $205,745 because
$21,842 was awarded in one motion and $800 was awarded in the other. Therefore, the average
amount awarded excluding these two large motions was $748. This would result in the court
awarding 72.5% of the amount requested or a 27.5% reduction.
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dollar amounts of billable time in the successful motions where the
moving attorney segregated fees from costs and specified the
number of billable hours. The specific subcategories were as
follows: (1) Cases where the amount awarded equalled the amount
requested ($91,012); (2) cases where the amount awarded was less
than the amount requested ($137,240); and (3) cases where the
amount awarded was more than the amount requested ($3,360). An
additional $11,607 (or 3.5% of total requested) was awarded for
costs.48 The remaining $89,915 was reported as general requests
in the 37 motioris in which attorneys did not differentiate between
fees and costs.
The total hours specified by attorneys as billable time in those
motions, where the attorneys segregated fees from costs was 1,716.
Dividing this figure into the $231,612 of total billable time reported
results in an average billable rate requested for successful motions
of $135 per hour. 49 This is $3.00 less than the average billing rate
requested for all motions of $138 per hour."
b. Hourly Rate Awarded
1). Methodology
The average hourly rate awarded by the court for all motions
where sanctions were awarded cannot be accurately represented by
one number. It is fair to present a range when calculating the
average billing rate awarded by the court. The need for a range
arises due to the nature of motions and court minute orders. In their
moving papers, most attorneys specify the hours spent in
preparation of the motion, their billing rate, the total amount of

48. Costs include court reporter fees, travel, expenses, and expert witness fees. Sometimes
they can be extensive. For example in Levy v. Diamant, Case # C663732, May 15, 1989, travel
expenses in the amount of $2,573 for a foreign attorney working on the case were not allowed.
However, the motion was granted.
49. Because the total dollar amount reported for billable time and the total billable hours
reported were clearly stated in the motions, no range is necessary.
50. See supra page 21 (setting forth the average hourly rate requested by attorneys in the
studiable motions). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the average billing
rate requested).

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An EmpiricalStudy
costs incurred, and the total request for sanctions. Court minute
orders, however, only specify the total amount of sanctions granted
and do not specify which portion of the award is for costs and
which is for the attorney's billable time. Also, judges often pick a
"round number" as the amount of the award.
Therefore, in order to determine an hourly rate, three
calculations were performed. The lowest calculation assumes all
costs were granted and subtracts this from the total awarded. The
remaining amount is presumed to represent attorney fees and is
used to calculate the billable rate awarded from the reported hours.
This method produces what will be called the "lowest calculable
amount."
The highest calculation assumes that no costs were awarded.
The total amount awarded is presumed to represent attorney's fees
and is divided by the hours reported to arrive at the billing rate
awarded. This method produces what will be called the "highest
calculable amount."
Since both of these numbers operate at the extremes, perhaps
a more representative method allocates the amount awarded
according to the percentage reported for costs and billable time. It
assumes that the court reduced both the costs and the attorney's
fees requested by the same percentage. For example, if the amount
awarded by the court was 75% of that requested by the attorney,
it was assumed that both the costs and the billable time requested
by the attorney were reduced by 25%. In other words, if 75% of
the sanction request was for fees and 25% was for costs, then 75%
of the amount awarded was allocated to fees. This "allocation
method" then divides the amount allocated for attorney's fees by
the hours reported to arrive at the billing rate.
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2). Result
In the category of all successful motions for sanctions, the three
methods for computation of the hourly rate of attorney's fees
awarded produce the following numbers. The lowest calculable
amount is $99 per hour. The highest calculable amount is $105 per
hour. The allocation method produces an hourly rate awarded of
$100.
c. Subcategories of Successful Motions
For analysis, the category of successful motions has been
divided into three subcategories wherein: (1) the amount awarded
was equal to the amount requested; (2) the amount awarded was
less than the amount requested; and (3) the amount awarded was
greater than the amount requested. These categories, along with the
categories of unsuccessful motions, are displayed in the following
graphs:
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1). Motions ForMonetary Sanctions In Which Amount
Awarded Equalled The Amount Requested
In 140 or 50.5% of the successful motions, the attorneys were
completely successful by receiving the entire amount requested.
This is 27.1% of the total motions. The total amount of sanctions
awarded and requested was $127,506. The average amount awarded
and requested per motion was $91 L"
Of the total requested of $127,506, $95,116 in sanctions52 was
requested in the 122 motions where the attorneys specified billable
hours and segregated fees from costs. Eighteen motions requesting
$32,390 were of the general request variety in that the attorneys did
not differentiate between fees and costs.
Where specified, attorney's fees were $91,012 and costs totalled
$4,104. Therefore, approximately 96% of the amount requested in
each motion was for attorney's fees and 4% was for costs
associated with the motion.
The total attorney time expended where specified was 746
hours. This results in an average time expended per motion of 6.1
hours53 at an hourly billing rate of $122." 4
2). Motions For Monetary Sanctions In Which The
Amount Awarded Was Less Than The Amount
Requested
Motions in this category comprise 130 or 46.9% of the
successful motions. This is 25.2% of the total motions. The total
dollar amount of sanctions requested was $201,372. The total dollar
amount awarded was $93,635, which is 46.5% of the amount

51. This figure is the result of dividing $127,506 by 140. If one large request of $21,842 is
excluded from this total, the total requested is reduced to $105,664 and the average requested per
motion drops to $760.
52. This figure includes both fees and costs.
53. This figure is computed by dividing 746 by 122.
54. The total billable hours of $91,012 divided by the total hours billed of 746.
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requested. The average amount requested per motion was
$1,549. 55 The average monetary sanction awarded by the court
was $720 per motion, again representing 46.5% of the original
request.
Of the total requested of $201,372, $143,847 in sanctions56
was requested in the 111 motions where the attorneys specified
billable hours and segregated fees from costs. In nineteen motions
the attorneys made general requests of $57,525. 57
Where specified, attorney's fees were $137,240 and costs
totalled $6,607. The motions in this category had roughly the same
apportionment of time billed versus costs as those motions where
the amount awarded equalled the amount requested.58 On average
these motions involved 95% billable time ($137,240) and 5% for
costs ($6,607) out of the total amount requested of $143,847. 59
The total billable hours reported in this category was 940. This
results in an average time expended per motion of 8.5 hours' and
an average hourly billable rate request of $146.61
The court awarded the successful moving parties an hourly
billing rate of $80 under the allocation method. This represents a
reduction of the hourly billing rate requested of 45%.62 The
lowest calculable amount is $77. The highest calculable amount is
$84.63

55. If one large request of $27,402 is excluded form these calculations, the total requested is
reduced to $173,970 and the average amount requested per motion drops to $1,348. While the

average amount awarded per motion would not be affected significantly (because the court awarded
only $800) the total amount awarded is reduced to $92,835. Accordingly, the percentage awarded of
the original request would increase from 46.5% to 53.3%.
56. This figure includes bath fees and costs.
57. A total of $14,689 was awarded in these motions.
58. The previous category represented a 96% to 4% request breakdown between billable hours
and costs.
59. The remaining $57,525 in requests was of the general request variety, resulting in a total
amount requested of $201,372.
60. This figure is the result of dividing 940 by 111 (the number of motions where hours were
specified).
61. The total billable hours of $137,240 divided by the total hours billed of 940.
62. The total billable rate requested of $146 as compared to the billable rate awarded of $80.
63. See supra pages 22-23 for the basis of these calculations.
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3). Comparison of Categories 1) and 2): Excessive
Requests Are Unwise
In comparing the statistics for the motions in which the amount
awarded equalled the amount requested" with the motions 6in5
which the amount awarded was less than the amount requested,
it is interesting to note a common negotiating strategy that does not
appear to work in the sanctions context -- the strategy of asking for
more than the amount which one is likely to be awarded on the
theory that the request will be reduced in any event. Under this
theory, even with a reduction, the moving party would still come
out ahead of the amount that would have been granted if it had
asked for the correct amount in the first place. However, this does
not hold true.
This study shows that in the cases where trial judges award
sanctions, they do not overwhelmingly tend to compromise by
reducing the amount of sanctions requested. In fact, the motions are
about evenly split between those in which the amount awarded
equalled the amount requested (50%) and in which where the
amount requested was reduced (47%).
Furthermore, the attorneys who did not request more than they
were awarded did better monetarily. The average sanction amount
awarded per motion where the amount requested equalled the
amount awarded was $911. The average hourly rate requested and
awarded in this category was $122. The average sanction awarded
where the amount requested was reduced was $720, which is a
reduction of 53.5% from the average amount requested of $1,549.
This was $191 less than the average where the amount requested
equalled the amount awarded. The average hourly rate using the
allocation method where the amount requested was reduced was
$80, a 45% reduction from the average billable rate requested of
$146. This is $42 per hour less under the allocation method than

64. See supranotes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing motions for monetary sanctions
in which the amount awarded equalled the amount requested).
65. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing motions for monetary sanctions
in which the amount awarded was less than the amount requested).
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the average hourly billing rate of $122 awarded where the judge
did not see the need to reduce the amount of sanctions
requested.'
4). Motions For Monetary Sanctions In Which The
Amount Awarded Was Greater Than The Amount
Requested
Only seven cases or 2.5% of the successful motions comprise
this category. This is 1.4% of the studiable motions. These motions
requested a total of $4,256. A total amount of $7,246 was awarded
by the courts. This was 170.3% of the amount requested, or a
70.3% increase. The average amount requested per motion was
$608.
In all seven cases the attorneys specified the amount of
attorneys time and billable hours expended. The average time
expended per motion was 4.2 hours at an hourly billing rate of
$112. The courts awarded an average amount per motion of $1,035
at an average hourly billing rate of between $191 and $21 1.6
The increase in sanction awards is peculiar because, according
to all of the code sections studied, the courts are authorized to
award reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. It is difficult to
imagine an attorney underestimating the time and expenses of
bringing the motion or a judge being able to determine reasonable
fees and expenses without support from the requesting attorney's
moving papers.
Of these seven cases, some seemed to involve an extra amount
of costs awarded, some involved an increased award because of

66. Under the lowest calculable amount the difference would be $122 minus $71, or $51.
Under the highest calculable amount, the difference would be $122 minus $84, or $38. See supra
pages 22-23 (discussing methods used to calculate the hourly rate awarded for all motions where
sanctions were awarded).
67. Of the total amount requested of $4,256, 69% of the amount was based on billable hours,

and 21% was based on costs. Because the court's minute orders do not specify the basis of the award,
one could assume that the billable hours and cost percentages would remain constant. Therefore,
using 69% of the total amount awarded as the amount of attorneys fees awarded, the court awarded
an average billing rate of $191. However, if by increasing the award, the court increased the billable
hours only and not the costs reported, the hourly billing rate would increase to $211.
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egregious conduct, and some simply seemed to be the result of the
judge awarding a "round number."
5). The Effects of Specifying Fees and Billable Hours
a). Motions In Which The Amount Awarded Was
Less Than The Amount Requested
In those motions where the court reduced the amount requested,
the attorneys were usually thorough in their moving papers by
specifying the total billable time requested and the total billable
hours worked. This was done in 111 motions where a total of
$143,847 in fees and costs was requested. The amount awarded in
these motions was $78,946. This was 55% of the amount requested
or an average of $711 per motion.
In nineteen of the motions stated, the attorneys did not itemize
their fees, costs, and billable hours, but rather requested a lump
sum in sanctions. In these nineteen cases a total of $57,525 was
requested. Only $14,689 was awarded. This was 25% of the
amount requested as compared to an award of 54% of the amount
requested where the fees were specified. Interestingly though, the
average sanction amount awarded in these motions was $773, more
than the $711 awarded where fees were specified.
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that in this limited
sample of nineteen motions with unspecified requests, the attorneys
asked for much more to begin with -- an average request of $3,027
where fees were unspecified as opposed to $1,295 where fees were
specified. Even though the unspecified requests were cut 75% as
opposed to the specified requests which were cut only 46%, the
average amount awarded for the nineteen unspecified requests
turned out to be approximately 9% higher.
b). Motions In Which The Amount Awarded Was
Greater Than The Amount Requested
In all of the cases where the judges awarded more money than
the attorneys requested, the attorneys specified their fees and hours.
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3. Unsuccessful Motionsfor Monetary Sanctions
In 239 motions, or 46.3% of the cases studied, monetary
sanctions were requested and denied. In these cases, $497,015 was
requested by the moving parties. This category is divided into two
subcategories as follows: (1) Motions in which no monetary
sanctions were granted and the substantive motion was denied; and
(2) motions in which no monetary sanctions were granted but the
substantive motion was granted.
a. Motions In Which No Monetary Sanctions Were
Awarded And The Substantive Motion Was Denied
One hundred twenty-two (122) cases fell within this category,
representing $349,884 in requests. The average amount requested
per motion was $2,868.68 In this category, thirty-six motions
contained general unspecified requests totalling $160,809. In the
remaining eighty-six cases in which fees, billable hours, and costs
were specified, $106,028 was reported as fees and $83,047 was
reported as costs. The average time reported per motion where fees
and costs were specified was 8.45 hours at an hourly billing rate of
$146.
The motions that differentiated between fees and costs in this
category are unusual because of the ratio of costs to attorney's fees.
Only 56% of the total amount requested was for attorney's fees and
44% of the amount requested was for costs.

68. Four large general requests totalling $133,685 are included in this average ($59,708;
$34,900; $24,715; and $14,362). If these requests are excluded, the total amount requested is
$216,199 and the average amount requested per motion drops to $1,832.
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b. Motions In Which No Monetary Sanctions Were
Awarded But The Substantive Motion Was Granted
There were 117 cases within this category, representing
$147,131 in requests. The average amount requested per motion
was $1,257.69 In this category, twenty-three motions had general
unspecified requests totalling $16,658. In the remaining ninety-four
motions where fees, billable hours, and costs were specified,
$90,304 was reported as fees and $40,169 was reported as costs.
The average time reported per motion where fees and costs were
specified was 7.0 hours at an hourly billing rate of $136 an hour.
The motions in this category had the usual allocation between
fees and costs by designating the majority of the request (69%) for
fees, and the remainder (31%) for costs.

69.

No unusually large requests (over $10,000) were included in this category.
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The following graphs show comparisons of the total amounts,
average amounts, and hourly rates requested and awarded for the
various categories of motions.
A COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL AMOUNTS
REQUESTED AND AWARDED
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A COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE HOURLY RATES
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C. Fast Track v. Slow Track Breakdown
The study analyzed 49570 motions for sanctions on the basis
of whether the judge who heard the motion was assigned to the
Fast Track or Slow Track.7"
1. Fast Track
Twenty-three judges assigned to the Fast Track were examined.
They decided a total of 192 motions for sanctions. Each judge
heard between five and fifteen motions, or about eight motions
each. Of the 192 motions for sanctions heard, 119 or 62% were
granted. Seventy-three or 38% were denied. A total of $224,528 in
monetary sanctions was requested and $91,070 was awarded. This
was 40.6% of the amount requested. The Fast Track judges
awarded an average of $765 per successful motion 72 at a billing
rate of $106 per hour. 3 In cases where the Fast Track judges
awarded sanctions, they allowed 74.2% of the sanctions
requested.74

70. There were 192 cases in the Fast Track and the 303 cases in the Slow Track. The number
of motions studied is 21 fewer motions than the total "studiable" motions of516. These 21 motions
were attributed to 6 judges who had less than 5 decisions each. These motions and judges were not
included in the computations because the sample for these judges would be too small to give a fair
indication of the judge's particular awarding pattern. The cutoff was 5 cases or more, which a
majority of the judges had.
71. See supra note 20 for a description of the Fast Track and Slow Track programs.
72. $91,070 divided by 119 (total successful motions).
73. The lowest calculable billing rate awarded was $104 per hour and the highest was $114
per hour. The $106 rate was calculated under the allocation method. See supra pages 22-23 for the
basis of these calculations. These calculations do not include the general requests which did not
specify fees, costs, and billable hours. The computations required using only those motions where
attorneys specified fees, costs, and billable hours.
74. This figure represents the slugging percentage described in infra note 86 and
accompanying text. Sanctions granted pursuant to both general requests where no allocation between
fees and costs was made, and specific requests where attorneys did segregate fees and costs, were
included in this calculation. Both request types were included because they demonstrate the actual
level of sanctions awarded versus sanctions requested.
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2. Slow Track
The study analyzed five Slow Track judges who heard between
25 and 113 sanctions motions each for a total of 303 motions. 75
The Slow Track judges awarded sanctions in 149 or 49.2% of the
motions heard. One hundred fifty-four were denied, or 50.8%. A
total of $582,062 in monetary sanctions was requested and
$136,284 was awarded. This was 23.4% of the amount requested.
The Slow Track judges awarded an average of $915 per successful
motion 76 at a billing rate of $93 an hour. 7 In cases where the
Slow Track judges granted sanctions, they allowed 73.6% of the
sanctions requested.78
3. Comparison
On the average, the Fast Track judges granted sanctions more
often (62% as compared to 49%) and gave a higher average billing
rate ($106 as compared to $93) than did the Slow Track judges.
However, when the judges did award sanctions, the slugging
rates79 of the Fast Track and Slow Track were quite similar
(74.2% on the Fast Track as compared to 73.6% on the Slow
Track). The average sanction awarded by the Slow Track judges
was higher than the average sanction awarded by the Fast Track
judges ($914 as compared to $765). The graphs below compare the
sanctions given by the Fast Track and Slow Track judges.

75. The two Slow Track judges assigned to the Law and Motion departments heard 78 and
113 motions respectively. Thus, the sanctioning patterns of one individual Slow Track judge would
affect the outcome much more than would a pattern of an individual Fast Track judge.
76. $136,284 divided by 149 (total successful motions).
77. The lowest calculable billing rate awarded was $90 per hour and the highest was $99 per
hour. The $93 rate was calculated under the allocation method. See supra pages 22-23 for the basis
of these calculations. These calculations do not include the general requests which did not specify
fees, costs, and billable hours. The computations required analyzing only those motions where
attorneys specified fees, costs, and billable hours.
78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (setting forth the average amount of monetary
sanctions requested in motions in which no monetary sanctions were awarded but the substantive

motion was granted).
79.

See infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the slugging percentage).
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Another noticeable distinction between the two tracks is the
frequency of motions requesting sanctions. While cases are divided
almost evenly between the two tracks,80 approximately 22.4%
more motions for sanctions were filed in cases on the Slow Track
than in cases on the Fast Track." This apportionment is displayed
below.

80.
81.

On the basis of assignment on an odd and even case number basis.
192 motions or 38.8% on the Fast Track versus 303 motions or 61.2% on the Slow Track.
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BREAKDOWN OF MOTIONS ON FAST TRACK AND SLOW TRACK

Fast Track
192 (38.8%)

Sfow Track
303 (61.2%)

Court

Number of Motions

Percent

Fast Track

192

38.8%

Slow Track

303

61.2%

Although impossible to prove, these differences are in all
likelihood due to the fact that less abuse of the pre-trial process
occurs in cases on the Fast Track since attorneys know that the
judge supervising the pre-trial proceedings will also be the trial
judge. With this type of "all purpose judge" system, attorneys are
less likely to engage in unauthorized pre-trial conduct because they
must face the same judge throughout the litigation. Also, the judges
are better able to control the conduct of the cases because they are
responsible for those cases in their entirety. Consequently, in cases
on the Fast Track, attorneys engage in less conduct warranting
sanctions and fewer motions for sanctions are brought.
Another observation related to the Fast Track is that attorneys
may be more conservative about bringing only meritorious motions
for sanctions and not asking for excessive amounts. Accordingly,
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although fewer motions for sanctions are brought in cases on the
Fast Track, a greater percentage of motions for sanctions are
granted than on the Slow Track.
In contrast, attorneys with cases on the Slow Track or master
calendar system tend to feel less restrained in their pre-trial conduct
because the law and motion judges rotate assignments periodically.
These attorneys may never have to face the same judge again.
Also, law and motion judges have no real control over other
aspects of the case. Therefore, in cases on the Slow Track,
attorneys are less cautious in their pre-trial conduct. They are more
likely to engage in conduct warranting sanctions and are more
likely to bring motions for sanctions which may not be meritorious.
D. The Judges Breakdown
The following breakdown considers the awarding pattern of
each of the judges analyzed in the preceding section. Results were
tabulated which indicate the total number of cases heard by each
judge analyzed, the total dollar amount requested in those cases,
and the total dollar amount subsequently awarded.
Also computed was the judge's "average" for awarding
monetary sanctions. This figure indicates the percentage of times
that the judge awarded sanctions out of the number of total cases
that judge heard. 2 For example, Judge 14 on the Fast Track heard
thirteen cases and awarded sanctions in eleven cases. His
"average" was 0.846.
A final computation was made to determine the equivalent of
a "slugging percentage" for each judge indicating the percentage
of the requested sanctions the judge awarded when he or she made
a monetary sanction award. This computation is roughly the same
as that used to calculate baseball slugging percentages. The figure
indicates the percent of the requested sanction awarded from 0%
to 100% when a sanction is given. It is an indication of whether a
particular judge reduced sanctions when he or she decided to award

82. All cases, including those where the attorney did not specify fees, costs, and billable hours,
were included in this computation.
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them. 3 For the example, Judge 14 awarded $6,014 out of $13,797
in sanctions requested. His "slug" was 0.555, which indicates that
in the eleven cases where sanctions were awarded, 55.5% of the
sanctions requested was awarded.
The judges are listed by number (Fast Track) and letter (Slow
Track) rather than by name to avoid the appearance of rating the
individual judges. This study does not attempt to second guess the
judges' decisions as to their correctness.
1. The Fast Track Judges:
The Fast Track judges heard 192 motions in the study. The
individual breakdown for the twenty-three Fast Track judges is as
follows:
Judge 1:"

-6 motions heard

Judge 2:

-6 motions heard
-5 motions granted
-$2,740 requested
-$2,326 awarded
-Avg. 0.833
-Slug. 1.000

Judge 4:"

-8 motions heard
-7 motions granted
-$6,593 requested
-$4,596 awarded
-Avg. 0.875
-Slug. 0.854

-4 motions granted
-$4,943 requested
-$2,954 awarded
-Avg. 0.667
-Slug. 1.34V5

Judge

3:16

-5 motions heard
-5 motions granted
-$7,633 requested
-$6,318 awarded
-Avg. 1.00
-Slug. 0.828

83. All cases, including those where the attorney did not specify fees, costs, and billable hours,
were included in this computation.
84. This judge was one of six judges who never granted the substantive motion and denied
sanctions. In other words, every time the judge granted the substantive motion, he also granted
sanctions. All other judges in the Fast Track granted one or more such motions. There were 41
motions of this kind granted in the Fast Track.
85. This judge was one of those judges who awarded more than the amount requested so that
the slugging percentage, or amount awarded as compared to the amount requested, was greatcr than
one. The exact amount of the increase was $750 over the $2,204 requested for a total of $2,954
awarded.
86. See supra note 84.
87. Id
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-15 motions heard
Judge 6 :"
-12 motions granted
-$19,636 requested
-$16,279 awarded
-Avg. 0.800
-Slug. 0.928

-5 motions heard

-9 motions heard
-7 motions granted
-$10,843 requested
-$ 3,980 awarded
-Avg. 0.777
-Slug. 0.791

Judge 8:

-6 motions heard

Judge 9:

-6 motions heard
-3 motions granted
-$3,726 requested
-$1,528 awarded
-Avg. 0.500
-Slug. 1.000

Judge 10:

-7 motions heard
-4 motions granted
-$7,756 requested
-$4,464 awarded
-Avg. 0.571
-Slug. 0.894

Judge 11:

-8 motions heard
-4 motions granted
-$11,328 requested
-$ 4,108 awarded
-Avg. 0.750
-Slug. 0.641

Judge 12:

-12 motions heard
-7 motions granted
-$16,666 requested
-$ 5,508 awarded
-Avg. 0.583
-Slug. 0.728

Judge 5:

Judge 7:

-$17,703 requested
-$ 2,616 awarded
-Avg. 0.800
-Slug. 0.783

-4 motions granted
-$4,657
-$2,847
-Avg.
-Slug.

Judge 13:"' -13 motions heard
Judge 14:"
-10 motions granted
-$12,592 requested
-$ 7,273 awarded
-Avg. 0.692
-Slug. 0.728

88.
89.

-4 motions granted

requested
awarded
0.667
0.888

-13 motions heard
-11 motions granted
-$13,797 requested
-$ 6,014 awarded
-Avg. 0.846
-Slug. 0.555

Id.
l

90. In 10 of 11 cases in which this judge granted sanctions (based on requests ranging from
$539 to $1,014) the judge awarded similar sanctions as follows:
5 at $475
4 at $575
1 at $675
Judge 14 appeared to favor dollar amounts ending in 75, which bore no relationship to the
amount of sanctions requested.
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Judge 15:91 -9 motions heard
-7 motions granted
-$10,020 requested
-$ 4,550 awarded
-Avg. 0.777
-Slug. 0.592

Judge 16:

-6 motions heard
-2 motions granted
-$ 3,804 requested
-$1,164 awarded
-Avg. 0.333
-Slug. 1.000

Judge 17:

-7 motions heard
-3 motions granted
-$ 6,248 requested
-$ 1,781 awarded
-Avg. 0.429
-Slug. 0.947

Judge 18:

-6 motions heard
-2 motions granted
-$ 4,439 requested
-$1,719 awarded
-Avg. 0.333
-Slug. 0.762

Judge 19:

-13 motions heard
-3 motions granted
-$16,100 requested
-$ 1,364 awarded
-Avg. 0.231
-Slug. 0.773

Judge 20:

-10 motions heard

-12 motions heard
-6 motions granted
-$12,710 requested
-$ 2,614 awarded
-Avg. 0.500
-Slug. 0.401

Judge 22:

Judge 21:

Judge 23:

91.

-5 motions heard
-0 motions granted
-$12,572 requested
-$ 000 awarded
-Avg. 0.000
-Slug. 0.000

See supra note 84.

-6 motions granted
-$14,555 requested
-$ 3,600 awarded
-Avg. 0.600
-Slug. 0.357
-5 motions heard

-2 motions granted
-$ 3,467 requested
-$ 500 awarded
-Avg. 0.400
-Slug. 0.465

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An Empirical Study
2. The Slow Track Judges.9
The Slow Track judges heard 303 motions in the study. The
individual breakdown for the five Slow Track judges is as follows:
Judge A:

-25 motions heard Judge B:
-16 motions granted
-$114,771 requested
-$ 12,229 awarded

-Avg.
-Slug.
Judge C:

Judge E:

0.640
0.916

-39 motions heard
Judge D:
-23 motions granted
-$ 58,359 requested
-$ 39,434 awarded
-Avg. 0.590
-Slug. 0.856

-48 motions heard
-31 motions granted
-$50,290 requested
-$25,983 awarded
-Avg. 0.646
-Slug. 0.817
-78 motions heard
-38 motions granted
-$101,533 requested
-$ 26,756 awarded

-Avg.
-Slug.

0.487
0.681

-113 motions heard

-41 motions granted
-$257,109 requested
-$ 31,882 awarded
-Avg. 0.363
-Slug. 0.409'3

E. Discovery Act Breakdown
The overwhelming majority of motions for pre-trial sanctions
that were brought during the study period involved requests for
sanctions due to alleged discovery violations. Only forty-three
motions relied solely on Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 and
did not involve discovery disputes. The remaining 473, or 91.7%
motions, were brought on the basis of sanctions provisions in the

92. This group includes the judges sitting in the Law and Motion Departments.
93. This judge was one of two judges who heard and grafited a large request for sanctions.
However, unlike the other judge who gave the amount requested, this judge reduced the sanction
requested of $27,402 by 26,602, or 97%, and awarded an $800 sanction. If this award is eliminated
from the judge's "slug rate," the new "slug rate" would increase to 0.613.
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Discovery Act. 94 The graph below illustrates these numbers. If
this percentage is applied to the total amount of sanctions motions
(813) in the two-month period and then a yearly figure is found, it
amounts to approximately 745 discovery sanctions motion in two
months or 4,470 per year.
DIscovERY VERSUS NON-DIsCOVERY MOTONS

Discovery
91.7%
Non.Discovery
8.3%

Motion Type
Discovery
Non-Discovery

_

Number of Motions

Percent

473

91.7%

43

8.3%

This breakdown analyzes the motions brought under the
Discovery Act in terms of the number and percentage of times each
code section was cited as the primary basis for sanctions and the
success rate.95 In this way it can be shown in which area of

(i), (")(1)-(3),
94. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2017(c)-(d); 2019(b)(2); 2023(a)(9); 2025(0),
(n), (o), (a)(1)-(2); 2028(d)(1)-(2); 2030(e), (k), (I), (m); 203 1(e), (k), (1), (m); 2032(c)(6)-(7), (g)(l),
(h), (j); 2033(e), (k), (1), (o); 2034(e), (1), ("),(k), (I) (West 1990).
95. This breakdown tracks the number of times a discovery code section was cited within a
successful or unsuccessful motion. Because often a motion involved several different code sections,
809 different cites were found in the 516 studiable cases. References to irrelevant or non-existent
cod. sections (for sanctions purposes) were excluded.
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discovery litigants and judges feel that sanctions are necessary
because abuse has occurred.
The chart which follows gives the following information. For
each code section, excluding subsections, there is listed the total
number of motions in which the code section was cited ("total
cited"),96 the percentage of the 516 studiable motions that total
comprised ("percentage of motions"),97 the number of motions
that were granted, the number denied, and the percentage success
rate.
These total figures were tallied to exclude double counting.
Therefore, if a motion cited Code of Civil Procedure sections
2025(e), (g), and (i), section 2025 was only credited with one cite.
From these figures it can be determined which different areas of
discovery involved the most disputes for which sanctions were
sought.
An attempt also was made to indicate some of the common
problem areas within each code section. Under some of the
discovery code sections, subsections are listed on the chart showing
the total number of times cited, the number granted, and the
number denied. If an attorney specifically cited a subsection that
involved sanctionable conduct, it was noted on the chart under
these headings. If a motion cited Code of Civil Procedure sections
2025(e), (g) and (i), subsections (e), (g), and (i) were each credited
with one cite. The total subsection citations listed under each code
section will not equal the total citations for each code section
because most of the citations are listed under the main headings
only. This is because often the attorneys did not cite subsections
but only the main code section; often attorneys incorrectly cited
subsections which did not involve sanctionable conduct (these were
noted on the chart under the main headings only) and sometimes
more than one subsection was listed. 98

96.
97.

I&
This percentage reflects the number of times a specific code section appeared in the 516

studiable motions. These percentages will total more than 100% because motions often cited more
than one code section. In total, there were 809 different cites in the 516 studiable motions.
98.
The "actions sanctioned" column of the chart was in part taken from 2 Civil Discovery
Practice,p. 926 (Cal. CEB 1988).

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23

00

to
0

B'
00

.r .

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An Empirical Study

z0

0

to

31

0

W

'a
0

--

toCo

00

=

U 0
o

.
0

D

Co~

U~ 0

00

1

C:

go

00

~

C. 0A
9oco

E

0

00

0o

0g

00
Or=

N0

0

0

00

.0

100

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23

C,'

-

C

z

0-

eq

~

00

00

0
0-

00,0

to'.00

0.

-00

0'

?;Co

Co*

0

0

b

b

to0

a0

lox

N

2o

'E~

9

.00
*0

0

0

0

00
C3

0

000

r

ci00

Wo
CL

Q2_
en@

a..C1

_

_

_

__

_

_

_

_

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An Empirical Study

;g.

S

So

v.

0'

o~8o
0

.~0

-.

N9

:9HE

0

o .

C.(0

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23

I-I

in

0210

0

Nn

0

00

ot
-~09

0

0

00
00

o

to

0-0

00
I-:

L0

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An Empirical Study
The breakdown below shows three significant clusters1" of
motions for sanctions and, therefore, perceived areas of discovery
abuse:
1) Section 2025: depositions.
These 82 motions constituted 15.9% of motions for
and 16.6% of the motions for sanctions
sanctions'
involving discovery.0" Sanctions were granted in 67% of
these motions.
2) Section 2030: interrogatories.
These 182 motions constituted 35.3% of motions for sanctions
and 36.8% of the motions for sanctions involving discovery.
Sanctions were granted in 69% of these motions.
3) Section 2031: requests for production of documents and
inspection of tangible things.
These 144 motions constituted 27.9% of motions for sanctions
and 29.1% of the motions for sanctions involving discovery.
Sanctions were granted in 67% of these motions.

The clustering of the motions in the above-cited areas is not
surprising since depositions, interrogatories, and document
inspection requests are the most frequently used discovery devices
and are, therefore, likely to lead to the most discovery disputes.

100.

Section 2023, the general sanctions provision, was actually the most often cited code

section. There were 315 motions of this type. Two hundred twelve were successful and 103 were
unsuccessful.
101. This figure was computed based on the 516 studiable motions. Because the motions often

cited more than one discovery sanctions provision, these numbers (when combined with the
percentage of motions not involving discovery) will total more than 100%. What this figure reveals
is that in 82, or 15.99%, of the 516 studiable motions, sanctions were sought for (perhaps among
other things) violation of a discovery code provision involving depositions.
102. The percentage of "motions for sanctions involving discovery" computations were made
by using a sample of 494 motions. This is the 809 discovery citations found in the studiable sample
minus the 315 citations to § 2023, the general sanctions provision. The resulting figure of 494 reflects
the number of times that specific discovery devices, such as depositions, were the subject of a motion
for sanctions. Although 473 of the 516 studiable motions for sanctions involved discovery, this
number would give misleading results since many motions involved more than one type of discovery
device. The 494 number allows a more accurate analysis of the percentage of discovery disputes that
pertained to a certain discovery device such as depositions.
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The following graphs illustrate the clustering of the discovery
motions involving sanctions.
BREAKDowN OF MOTIONS INVOLVING DISCOVERY

§ 2030

§ 2025

§ 2033
§ 2031

Motion Type

Number of Motions

Percent

§2025

82

16.6%

§2030

182

36.8%

§2031

144

29.2%

§2032

23

4.7%

§2033

35

7.1%

§2034

13

2.6%

Other Discovery

15

3.0%

Total

494

100.0%
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OCCURENCE RATES OF DIScovERY SECTIONS IN
STUDIABLE MOTIONS
4OOn/,

-

F1,
F '§2017

§2019

Motion Type

-

a
§2025

§2o

§231

J

§2032

§2033

§2034

Percent I

§2017

1.7%

§2019

1.1%

§2025

15.9%

§2030

35.2%

§2031

27.9%

§2032

4.4%

§2033

6.7%

§2034

2.5%

3

103. The percentages are based on the 516 studiable motions and total more than 100 percent
because many motions cite more than one section.
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1. Conduct Eliciting Sanctions
This section of the Article sets forth the raw statistics found by
counting citations to discovery code sections and attempts to draw
some generalizations about sanctioned conduct gleaned from
reading and examining 516 motions for sanctions, responses, and
minute orders.
As mandated by the discovery statutes, non-compliance with
discovery rules or failure to cooperate in the discovery process
without reason was the type of conduct sanctioned by the judges.
Such conduct took many forms, ranging from the most obvious
abuse, where "no response" was given to a request for discovery,
to abuse involving responses that were so superficial that no true
good faith compliance could be said to have been made with the
discovery request.
The one motive that seemed to underlie these superficial
responses was delay. In most cases, the actual response was not
provided until after a six-month delay. Some litigants complied
with the discovery request only after a motion for sanctions had
been filed, thereby achieving their purpose of 'delay. Often judges
viewed this conduct as unreasonable and gave sanctions. A few
judges, however, denied sanctions unless the opposing party's
responses were inadequate, despite the absence of substantial
justification for the delay itself. One judge seemed inclined to deny
promised at
sanctions outright when compliance occurred or was
14
the hearing, despite prior willful non-compliance. 0
a. The Section 2025 Cluster: Depositions
Eighty-two motions for sanctions involved alleged misconduct
concerning depositions. This equalled 15.9% of all motions for
sanctions"0 5 and 16.6% of motions for sanctions concerning

104. Judge E of the slow track denied 20 motions for sanctions based on his holding that there
into the category of
was **no opposition" to the underlying substantive motion. This behavior falls
motions in which the substantive motion is granted but the sanction is denied.
105. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing studiable motions).
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discovery. 1" The overall success rate of motions brought under
section 2025 was 67%. If the subsection of section 2025 cited by
a moving attorney is an indication of the specific conduct
complained of, the following areas are those in which the most
disputes occurred.
The most frequent complaint concerning depositions was the
failure of a party or witness to attend a deposition. Section 2025(j)
was cited forty-eight times and comprised 58.5% of all section
2025 citations. These motions had a success rate of 75%.
Motions for protective orders was another ground for dispute.
Under section 2025(i), sanctions can be granted for unreasonably
making or opposing a motion for a protective order. This
subsection was cited six times and comprised 7.3% of all section
2025 citations. These motions had a success rate of 16.7%.
Motions for sanctions involving a deponent's failure to answer
a question or produce a document or thing resulted in eight
motions. This was 9.7% of all section 2025 citations. The success
rate of motions citing section 2025(o) was 87.5%.
It is interesting to note that the parties sought sanctions more
times for disagreements over whether the deposition would actually
take place 7 than they did over conduct at the deposition. Once
the deponent appeared and the deposition commenced, the requests
for sanctions regarding disputes that occurred during the
deposition 0 8 were relatively few.
Other areas of dispute involved motions for multiple failures to
secure an integral component of a deposition, such as a court
reporter or an interpreter, a deponent's conducting himself in a
fashion that made the deposition meaningless, prolonging
depositions due to adjournments and refusing to complete, and
blaming failure to comply on the client or on an attorney who
substituted out of the case. Of course, the variations within these

106. See supra note 105 (discussing the sanctions requested and awarded for violations of
various provisions of the Discovery Act).
107. § 20250) (failure to attend) (58.5%) and § 2025(1) (protective orders) (7.3%).
108. § 2025(o) (failure to answer or proceed) (9.7%).
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categories are as numerous as the varied factual patterns of the
cases.
Most of the motions revealed many attempts by the moving
parties to gain compliance. The respondent often provided
guarantees and apologies until it became clear that the goal was
one of delay. In the majority of these motions, compliance had not
been achieved by the time sanctions were imposed. Some attorneys
were able to bring the opposing parties in after one or two delays
and were just as successful as those who waited for many months.
b. The Section 2030 Cluster: Interrogatories
This section represents the largest cluster of citations, indicating
that most discovery disputes involve interrogatories. One hundred
eighty-two motions for sanctions involved disputes over
interrogatories. This was 35.3% of the total motions and 36.8% of
discovery motions. Sanctions were awarded 69% of the time.
Subsection (k) of section 2030, which involves failure to serve
responses, accounted for 112 motions. This was 61.5% of all
motions for sanctions brought under section 2030. The success rate
of these motions was 67%. Motions for sanctions brought to
compel further responses to interrogatories under subsection (1)
totalled thirty-four. This was 18.7% of the motions for sanctions
brought under section 2030. The success rate was 76%.
Interestingly, the same trend regarding the timing of disputes
that was seen with depositions was observed with interrogatories.
The disputes predominately concerned obtaining an initial response.
Most motions for sanctions were brought in connection with
motions to compel responses to interrogatories.t °" Once answers
were provided, sanction requests connected with motions to compel
further answers were much fewer."'
While the most common type of conduct that drew a monetary
sanction was providing responses which were untimely or

109.
110.

§ 2030(k) (where the opponent refused to provide any answer at all) (61.5%).
§ 2030(I) (to challenge the sufficiency of the response) (18.7%).
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inadequate,"' other types of conduct that judges found
unreasonable fell into the following categories: (1) The response
was "unverified" and later demands to correct it were ignored; (2)
selected parts of interrogatories were answered, but the remainder
were unanswered, even upon later demands to correct; (3)
inadequate responses and objections were made to Judicial Council
Form interrogatories; (4) after multiple extensions, a last minute
inadequate response was provided after a motion to compel was
served; (5) a response was withheld based on a completely
unsupported legal position; and (6) the failure to respond was
attributed to "heavy workload" or mistake.
For the most part, the declarations of the moving parties
indicated that the respondents made excuses, apologies, and
promises until the moving party decided to file a motion for
sanctions.
c. The Section 2031 Cluster: Inspection of Documents,
Places, and Things
Motions for sanctions involving requests for inspection of
documents numbered 144. This was 27.9% of the total motions and
29.1% of the discovery motions. The success rate was 67%.
Motions for sanctions involving motions to compel an initial
response to a request for production under section 2031(k)
accounted for seventy-one motions. This was 49.3% of all section
2031 motions. The success rate was 64%. Motions for sanctions
involving a motion to compel a further response under section
2031(1) numbered twenty-eight and comprised 19.4% of all section
2031 motions. The success rate was 61%. There were fourteen
motions for sanctions accompanying motions to compel compliance
with an inspection demand (actually produce the documents
promised) under section 2031(m). This amounted to 9.7% of all
section 2031 motions and had a success rate of 64%.

111. The untimeliness of a response also resulted in a waiver of the right to object to the
interrogatories.
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As with depositions and interrogatories, the requests for
sanctions involving motions to compel initial compliance" far
outnumbered 3 the disputes concerning the sufficiency of the

compliance."

The majority of motions for sanctions regarding production of
documents involved multiple delays by the opposing party in the
face of a rapidly approaching trial date. The opposing parties in
these situations would not comply at all or produced only limited
documents. Other examples of unreasonable conduct drawing
sanctions included objections based on the type of documents
requested. Financial records were most often withheld. Other
documents were withheld, claiming privileged protection ranging
from attorney-client privilege and "work-product"
to the Fifth
4
Constitution."
States
United
the
to
Amendment
2. "Repeat Offenders:" Multiple Sanctions
The "Repeat Offenders" fell into two categories: Those who
failed to comply with an earlier court order and those who had
been sanctioned but for different conduct. There were thirty-four
motions in this category, coming from twenty-eight different cases.
Twenty-four motions cited non-compliance with previous court
orders and ten involved different discovery violations.

112.

§ 2031(k)(responding to the request) (49.3%) and § 2031(m)(producing the documents)

(9.7%).
113. § 20310)(obtaining further response)(19.4%).
114. Several motions for sanctions were granted in cases involving so-called 'Cumis" counsel.
The opposing attorneys were accused of inflating legal bills to insurance companies. The attorneys
were unsuccessful in attempting to withhold their billing records. See Rodoni v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
Case #1C553394, July 7, 1989 motion; People of the State of California v. California Target
Enterprises, Case #C643467, June 2, 1989 motion. Cumis counsel are lawyers retained by an
insurance company to represent an insured when there may be a conflict of interest between the
insured and the insurance company.
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Sanctions were granted in seventeen of the thirty-four motions
and sanctions were denied in the remaining seventeen motions. The
successful motions fell into the following categories:
-

the sanction awarded equalled the amount requested: 5;
the sanction awarded was greater than the amount requested:
3; and
the sanction awarded was less than the amount requested: 9.

The thirty-four motions involved the following discovery code
sections:
Section 2025 - Depositions: 5;
Section 2030 - Interrogatories: 13;
Section 2031 - Production and Inspection Demands: 7; and
Other code sections: 9.

F. Utilization of Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.51 5 allows the
imposition of sanctions for any type of abuse of the pre-trial
process. This code provision can be used to request sanctions for
115.

Id.

CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1990) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Every trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay
any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another
party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay....
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "'Actions or tactics' include, but are not limited to, the making or
opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint or
cross-complaint. The mere filing of a complaint without service
thereof on an opposing party does not constitute 'actions or
tactics" for purposes of this section.
(2) "Frivolous" means (A) totally and completely without merit or (B)
for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.
(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice
contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the court's own
motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or
circumstances justifying the order.
(d) The liability imposed by this section is in addition to any other liability
imposed by law for acts or omissions within the purview of this section.
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conduct not involving discovery disputes. 6 Section 128.5 can
also be utilized in discovery disputes,"1 " but then it is cited in
conjunction with a discovery sanctions provision such as Code of
Civil Procedure Section 2023.
Section 128.5 authorizes the imposition of a monetary sanction
for actions or tactics that are taken in "bad faith" and are
118
"frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."
"Frivolous" is defined as being "totally and completely without
merit" or
"for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing
' )" 9
party.
Of the studiable motions, only eighty-five motions involved
section 128.5. This was 16.4% of the total.' 20 Forty-two of the
motions based on section 128.5, or 49.4%, involved discovery
disputes and were coupled with a request for sanctions under a
12 1
discovery sanctions provision.
Only forty-three motions involved non-discovery pre-trial
requests for sanctions." This was 8.3% of the total studiable
motions and 50.6% of the eighty-five motions utilizing section
128.5. The breakdown of section 128.5 motions is illustrated below.
1. Non-Discovery Requests ForSanctions Under Code of Civil
Procedure Section 128.5
The forty-three motions utilizing section 128.5 to obtain
sanctions for non-discovery disputes had a low success rate. Only

116. For example, if an attorney files a frivolous motion to strike or brings a bad faith demurrer
solely for the purpose of unnecessary delay, § 128.5 would be the code section under which sanctions
could be obtained.
117. Even though the Code of Civil Procedure has specific sanctions provisions for discovery
abuses, § 128.5 can also be used because it applies to any "actions or tactics" including but not
limited to "the making or opposing of motions."
118. CAL Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 128.5(a) (West 1990).
119. Id.at § 128.5(b) (West 1990).
120. The number refers to the total studiable motions of 516.
121. In fact, two of the 43 motions involved discovery disputes and cited only Code of Civil
Procedure § 128.5.
122. The 43 motions for sanctions in this category involved a full range of alleged sanctionable
conduct. The most frequent type of motion coupled with a § 128.5 request for sanctions involved
demurrers and/or motions to strike (6), and motions for summary judgment (4).
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thirteen of these motions were granted. Thirty of the motions for
sanctions were denied, amounting to a 70% denial rate. Of these
denials, fifteen or 50% denied the substantive relief sought in
conjunction with the motions, and fifteen or 50% granted
substantive relief but denied sanctions,1" as illustrated in the
following graph.
A COMPARISON OF §128.5 NoN-DiscovERY MOTIONS
AND § 128.5 DIScOvERY MOTIONS

§128.5 Non-Disc.
43 Cases (50.6%)

§128.5 Discovery

42 Cases (49.4%)

Motion Type

Number of Cases

Percent

§128.5
Non-Discovery

43

50.6%

§ 128.5 Discovery

42

49.4%

123. Presumably, in granting substantive relief but denying sanctions under Code of Civil
Procedure § 128.5, the court found the opposing counsel's action was non-meritorious but did not
rise to the level of being in "bad faith,** "frivolous," or "solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay."
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The total amount requested in sanctions for these forty-three
motions was $167,791, or an average of $3,902 per motion.'
This is much higher than the average amount requested for all
motions in the study of $1,608125 and all successful motions in
the study which was $1,203.126
The total amount awarded for the thirteen successful motions
involving the section 128.5 nondiscovery requests was $12,660, or
an average of $974 per motion." This was more than the
average for all successful motions in the study of $824.
Of the successful motions, nine specified hours billed, fees, and
costs. The average hourly rate requested in these motions was $140
per hour. The average hourly rate awarded by the court under the
allocation method was $117," as compared to $100 for all
motions in the study.129 These figures are illustrated in the
following graphs.

124. If two large requests of $59,708 and $34,900 are excluded from these figures, the total
requested drops to $73,183 and the average request becomes $1,785.
125. See supra note 41 and accompanying texL
126. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
127. This figure is the average of the successful non-discovery motions only and is the result
of dividing $12,660 by 13. If the total awarded of $12,660 is divided by the 43 non-discovery
motions, so that the average includes unsuccessful motions as well, then the average drops to $294.
128. The lowest calculable rate and the allocation method rate are almost equal and are
represented by the $117 per hour figure. However, the highest calculable rate is $122. These
calculations exclude a $6,000 request which only received $800. Had it been included, the hourly rate
awarded by the court under the allocation method would drop to $83.
129. See supra page 23 (discussing the allocation method as applied to all successful motions
for sanctions).
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DISPOSITION OF NON-DISCOVERY CASES
INVOLVING §128.5

S

Sanction Granted

Substantive
Motion Granted
Sanction Denied

Sanction Denied

[

Disposition

Substantive
Motion Denied
Sanction Denied

Percent

-Number

Sanction Granted

13

30.0%

Sanction Denied, Substantive
Motion Granted

15

35.0%

Sanction Denied, Substantive
Motion Denied

15

35.0%

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23
A COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT REQUESTED AND THE
TOTAL AMOUNT AWARDED IN §128.5 NON-DISCOVERY MOTIONS

8
;_

€:1saoo0o0

$18000000,
$160,000.00.
$140,000.00$120,000.00.
$100,000.00.
$80000.00$60,000.00-

8i

$4o,000.0$20,000.00.
Amount Requested

Description

Amount Awardod

Amount

Total Amount Requested

$167,791

Total Amount Awarded

$12,660

Percent Awarded

7.5%
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§ 128.5 NON-DISCOvERY MOTIONS: A COMPARISON OF THE
AVERAGE AMOUNT REQUESTED FOR ALL MOTIONS AND THE
AVERAGE AMOUNT AWARDED IN SUCCESSFuL MOTIONS

$5000.00

.

$4500.00
$4000.00$3500.00"

$3000.00$2500.00$2000.00$1500.00-

$500.00
Ave. Amount Requested

Description
Average Amount Requested for
all Motions
Average Amount Awarded in
Successful Motions

Ave. Award if Granted

Amount
$3,902
$974
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A COMPARISON OF THE §128.5 NoN-DIscOvERY
MOTIONS AVERAGE HouRLY RATE REQUESTED AND

AVERAGE HOURLY RATE AWARDED

SlAn nn
$120.00-

t

$100.00$80.00$60.00$40.00$20.00-

Average Rate Requested

Description

Average Rate Awardod

Amount

Average Hourly Rate Requested

$140

Average Hourly Rate Awarded

$117

Percent Awarded

83.6%

2. Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 Used to Obtain
Sanctionsfor Discovery Disputes
Forty-two motions utilized section 128.5 in conjunction with the
discovery sanctions provisions to obtain sanctions for discovery
disputes. Twenty-two or 52.4% of these requests were successful.
Of the twenty unsuccessful motions for sanctions in this category,
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ten (50%) denied all relief and ten (50%) granted substantive relief
but denied sanctions, as illustrated below.
DISPOSITION OF DIscOVERY MOTIONS INVOLVING §128.5

Sanction Granted

Substantive
Motion Denied

Substantive
Motion Granted
Sanction Denied
qeniSanction

Denied

Sanction Dne

Number

Percent

Sanction Granted

22

52.4%

Sanction Denied, Substantive
Motion Granted

10

23.8%

Sanction Denied, Substantive
Motion Denied

10

23.8%

Description

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 23
The total amount requested in sanctions for these forty-two
13
motions was $96,107, or an average of $2,288 per motion. 1
Again, this was higher than the average requested for all motions
in the study of $1,203.
The total amount awarded for the twenty-two successful
motions was $21,643. The average amount awarded per motion was
$984--higher than that awarded for non-discovery motions under
section 128.5 ($974) and greater than the average for all successful
motions in the study ($824).
Of the successful motions, eighteen specified fees, costs, and
billable hours. The average hourly rate requested was $144. The
average amount awarded was $82 131_- less than the $117 per hour
awarded when relief was sought for non-discovery motions under
section 128.5 and less than the amount for all motions in the study
($100). These figures are illustrated in the following graphs.

130. If two large requests of $24,714 and $14,362 are excluded, the total is $57,031 or an
average amount requested of $1,426.
131. This number is based upon the allocation method. The lowest calculable amount was $72
per hour and the highest was $95. See supra pages 22-23 for the basis of these calculations.

1991 / Pre-TrialSanctions: An EmpiricalStudy
A COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT REQUESTED AND
THE TOTAL AMOUNT AWARDED N §128.5 DiscovERY MOTIONS
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Amount

Total Amount Requested

$96,107

Total Amount Awarded

$21,643

Percent Awarded

22.5%
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§128.5 DIscovERY MOTIONS: A COMPARISON OF THE
AVERAGE AMOUNT REQUESTED FOR ALL MOTIONS AND
THE AVERAGE AMOUNT AWARDED iN SUCCESSFUL MOTIONS
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$500.00 *
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Average Requested

Description
Average Amount Requested for
all Motions
Average Amount Awarded in
Successful Motions

Average Awarded

Amount
$2,288
$984
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A COMPARISON OF TiE § 128.5 DIscOvERY MOTIONS
AVERAGE HOURLY RATE REQUESTED AND
AVERAGE HOURLY RATE AWARDED

8lf
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$140.00

$120.00
$100.00
$80.00
$60.00
$40.00
$20.00
$0.00

Avg. Rate Requested

Description

Amount

Average Hourly Rate Requested

$144

Average Hourly Rate Awarded

$82

Percent Awarded

56.9%

3. Time Breakdown of Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5
Requests
Set forth below is the percentage of time attributed by the
moving attorneys to various aspects of their sanction requests.
There is a slight difference in the breakdown between nondiscovery motions utilizing section 128.5 and discovery motions
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using section 128.5. However, both indicate a heavier emphasis in
the categories of time attributed to the preparation of the motions
and appearance time as compared to the breakdown for all of the
motions in the study.132
The percentage of time reported was categorized as follows:
Non-Discovery

Discovery

§ 128.5

§ 128.5

Motion

79%

69%

Appearance Time

16%

24%

Travel Time

5%

3.5%

Miscellaneous

0%

3.5%

Preparation of

4. Fast Track v. Slow Track
The success rates of the section 128.5 motions for sanctions
differ depending on whether they were heard on the Fast Track or
the Slow Track. The Fast Track judges granted 44.4% of the
section 128.5 motions (discovery and non-discovery) while the
Slow Track judges granted 38.7% of the motions. If the motions
were based on section 128.5 alone and did not involve discovery,
there was a 40% success rate on the Fast Track and a 25% success
rate on the Slow Track. If the motion was a discovery motion
utilizing section 128.5, there was a 47.6% success rate on the Fast
Track and a 57% success rate on the Slow Track. This comparison
is displayed below.

132.

The time breakdown for all motions in the study is contained in Part ]llB(I)(a).
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A COMPARISON OF THE SuccESs RATES OF § 128.5
MOTIONS ON THE FAST TRACK AND ON THE SLOW TRACK

finMG~

FagTruk
SlowTrwk

40.0%-

30.0%-

20.0%-

1o.0%_

Fast Track

Slow Track

Success Rate of All §128.5
Motions

44.4%

38.7%

Success Rate of §128.5 NonDiscovery Motions

40.0%

25.0%

Success Rate of §128.5
Discovery Motions

47.6%

57.0%

Disposition

G. Days of the Week
The computerization of the information allowed an analysis of
grant, denial, and off-calendar patterns by different days of the
week. The computations were performed more out of curiosity and
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do not purport to establish any causal correlations. Six hundred
twelve motions for sanctions were suitable for analysis.133
Total numbers could not be compared because there were two
court holidays in the nine week study.134 The study period
consisted of eight Mondays and Tuesdays and nine Wednesdays,
Thursdays, and Fridays. Therefore, comparisons were made using
average daily figures.
The day on which the greatest average number of motions for
pre-trial sanctions were bought was Wednesday. 3 ' This was
followed by Friday,1 36 Tuesday, 137 Thursday, 138 and
Monday. 1
In percentage terms, the best chance for successful motions was
on Tuesday, when 59.1% of the motions for sanctions were
granted. Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday had about the same
grant rate.' 4 The lowest percentage of sanctions motions were
granted on Monday, with a 42.2% grant rate. Not surprisingly, the
highest percentage of sanctions motions were removed from
calendar on Friday.
The chart below demonstrates these figures, as well as the
percentages of unsuccessful motions both where the underlying
substantive motion was granted and denied.

133. This is more than the 516 studiable motions because this figure includes off calendar
motions.
134. The court was closed on Memorial Day (Monday) and Independence Day, July 4
(Tuesday).

135.

154 total for the 9 Wednesdays in the study for a daily average of 17.

136.
137.
138.

136 total for the 9 Fridays for a daily average of 15.
105 total for the 8 Tuesday for a daily average of 13.
115 total for the 9 Thursdays for a daily average of 12.

139. 102 total for the 8 Mondays for a daily average of 12.
140. 53.2%, 53.9% and 53.7% respectively.
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A COMPARISON OF MOTION DISPOSmON
BY THE DAYS OF THE WEEK

The table shows the motion disposition In percent (and the actual number of
motions). The highlighted cells show the maximum percent In each field.

No$Sne
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Denied

Off Cwa

Number
MaOn
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27.4%
(2)

20.6%
(21)

9.8%
(10)
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12.8

59.1%
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20.0%
(21)

11.4%
(12)

9.5%
(10)

106

13.1
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5."2%
(2)

26.6%
(41)

15.%
(24)

4.6%
(7)

154

17.1

Thursday

53.9%
(62)

21.8%
(25)

16.5%
(19)

7.8%
(9)

115

12.8

5&.7%
(73)

20.6%
(2)

15,4%
(21)

10.3%
(14)

136

15.1

Day

Grant

No$Sanm
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Grantd

Monday

42.2%
(43)

Tuesday

Friday

1

MooWs
Per Day

Because of two court holidays during the study period, the study compared eight
Mondays and Tuesdays; and nine Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays.
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IV.

CONCLUSION -- THOUGHTS ON THE JUDICIAL

ATTIuDE TOWARD AWARDING SANCTIONS
This Article has attempted to set forth the results of the study
on pre-trial sanctions in a way that will be helpful to judges and
practitioners. This concluding section will not summarize the study.
Rather, it will outline the history and purpose of the sanctions
provisions and comment on the judges' use of their sanctioning
power with reference to the study's findings.
The discussion will focus on the sanctions provisions of the
Discovery Act. While Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 is also
applicable to this discussion, the discovery code sections will be
addressed for simplicity, since 93% of the sanctions requests
studied involved discovery.
Although this study did not analyze the judges' decisions as to
correctness, certain trends were evident which revealed that the
judges may not be using their power to sanction to the full extent
possible in order to prevent discovery and other pre-trial abuse. In
the study period, motions for sanctions were granted 54% of the
time and denied 46% of the time. The study isolated four
4
categories of judicial rulings:' '
(1) Sanctions which were awarded and equalled the amount
requested (27% of the cases);

(2) Sanctions which were awarded but the amount requested was
reduced by the judge (25% of the cases);
(3) The substantive motion was denied so no sanction was given
(24% of the cases);
(4) The substantive motion was granted but no sanction was given
42
(23% of the cases).'

141. See supranotes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing motions for monetary sanctions
in which the amount awarded equalled or was less than the amount requested); pago 32-33
(discussing motions in which sanctions were denied and the substantive motion was denied, and
motions in which the substantive motion was granted but no sanction was given).
142. These figures do not total 100% because in 1% of the cases the amount awarded was
greater than the amount requested.
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A. PotentialProblem Areas
Two of the -above-stated categories present no problems.
Certainly, no one can quarrel with the decisions in category three
where the sanction was denied and the substantive motion was
denied. Of course, if an attorney is unsuccessful in a motion, his
adversary's position has been vindicated and the moving attorney
is not entitled to sanctions.
Similarly, the motions falling within category one where the
motion was granted and the amount of the sanction awarded was
the amount requested by the moving party are not problematic.
This category of motions will be discussed in Part E, below.143
The other two categories may evidence a problem -- category
four comprising 23% of the cases where the substantive motion
was granted but the sanction request was denied, 1" and category
two comprising 25% of the cases where the substantive motion was
granted, a sanction was given, but it was less (53.3% less on the
average) 4 5 than the amount requested.
In these two categories of cases, it is undisputed that a
discovery rule violation had occurred because the motion for
substantive relief was granted. However, for some reason the
judges failed to grant the amount of sanctions requested by the
moving party and sworn to in his or her declaration as being the
amount of the moving party's expenses of bringing the motion.
B. Purposes of The Discovery Sanctions Provisions
The California Civil Discovery Act 146 was revised in 1987 to
achieve the purpose, among others, of strengthening the sanctions
provisions for failure to comply with the discovery rules and to
143. See infra page 189.
144. See supra page 33 discussing cases where the substantive motion was granted but the
sanction request was denied).
145. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the cases where the substantive
motion was granted, but the sanction award was less than the amount requested).
146. The California Civil Discovery Act of 1986 became effective on July 1, 1987. The Act
was the result of the efforts of a joint commission of the State Bar and Judicial Council to revise the
original 1957 system of civil discovery.
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prevent discovery abuse by the increased use of sanctions. 147 The
drafters perceived a problem with judges being reluctant to utilize
their power to impose sanctions. 148 To remedy this problem, the
Discovery Act of 1986 authorized various degrees of sanctions for
discovery abuses and attempted to clarify what constituted
discovery abuse. The revised sanctions provisions of the Act gave
judges a tool by which they could limit discovery abuse by
imposing meaningful and mandatory monetary sanctions. In
creating the sanctions provisions of the Act, the drafters did not
intend to "narrow the discretion of the court, but rather [to press]
the court to address itself to abusive practices." 149 By passing the
Discovery Act of 1986, the legislature seems to have challenged
the judicial branch to put the lid on rampant discovery abuse by
monetary sanctions to an extent far greater
employing meaningful
15 0
than in the past.
The Discovery Act made two significant changes strengthening
the likelihood of monetary sanctions. First, it shifted the focus of
"substantial justification" for delay or abusive acts. Previously, an
award of sanctions was made only if the losing party was found to
have acted without substantial justification. The Discovery Act now
requires imposition of a monetary sanction for various forms of
conduct 151 "unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction
acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make
the imposition of the sanction unjust. ' 152 The test of "substantial
justification" remains the same, but the change in language was

147. Smith, "'Early Reflections on the Discovery Act of 1986" from PreparingNow for
Discovery Under the New Act, California Continuing Education of the Bar Program Material,
Oct.INov. 1986, p. 9.
148. It was said that "some law and motion courts demonstrate[d] timidity or inflexibility over
discovery abuses and sanctions, with a good deal of unhealthy divergence in treatment from county
to county." Id. at 4.
149. Hogan, Reporter's Notes to Proposed California Civil Discovery Act of 1986.
150. Smith, supra note 150, at 9.
151. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2017(c)-(d); 2019(b)(2); 2023(a)(9); 2025(e), (g), (i), ()(l)-(3),
(n), (o), (q)(1)-(2); 2028(d)(l)-(2); 2030(e), (k), (1), (m); 2031(e), (k), (0),(m); 2032(c)(6)-(7), (g)(1),
(h), 0); 2033(e), (k), (1), (o); 2034(e), (i), j), (k), (1) (West 1990).
152. CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE §§ 2017(c)-(d); 2019(b)(2); 2025(e)(3)(G), (g), (i), (j)Cl)-(3), (n),
(o), (q)(l)-(2); 2028(d)(1)-(2); 2030(e), (k), (), (m); 2031(e), (k), (i), (in); 2032(c)(6)-(7), (g)(l), (h'),
(J); 2033(e), (k), (1), (6); 2034(e), (i), (0), (k), (1)(West 1990) (emphasis added).
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intended to make judges more alert to abuses occurring in the
discovery process.'53 Second, the Discovery Act makes the
imposition of sanctions mandatory, whereas, prior to the revisions,
sanctions were discretionary.'54
The Discovery Act reflects the "legislative intent to shift fees
and costs to the party who has failed to comply with the act." ' 5
"If the sanction provisions of the Discovery Act are to be a
credible deterrent to discovery abuses, they must be applied to
prevent a losing party from accomplishing indirectly that which it
is expressly prohibited from doing directly -- forcing a party who
deals fairly to pay for the abusive tactics of one who does
not." 56 If a discovery abuser is not forced to pay for his or her
tactics, then the abusive approach has been successful. The abuser
has managed to harass and delay the opposition and make the
opposing party incur uncompensated fees and costs to obtain
discovery compliance.
C. Motions In Which The Substantive Motion Was Granted And
The Sanction Was Denied
' support for the
In light of the strong legislative and judicial 57
expanded use of sanctions, the 117 cases in the study in which the
substantive motion was granted but the sanction was denied should
be examined. Since the judges in the study granted the underlying
motion, they must have found that the moving party's position was
correct. However, the key to whether the judges were utilizing their
sanctioning powers correctly involves whether they also actually

153. Hogan, Reporter's Notes to Proposed California Civil Discovery Act of 1986.
154. Id. The court "shall" impose a monetary sanction "'unless it finds that the one subject
to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the sanction
unjust." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2017(c)-(d); 2019(b)(2); 2023(a)(9); 2025(e), (g), (i), 0)(1)-(3),
(n), (o), (q)(I)-(2); 2028(d)(l)-(2);-2030(e), (k), (), (in); 2031(e), (k), (1), (in); 2032(c)(6)-(7), (g)(1),
(h), (6); 2033(e), (k), (), (o); 2034(e), (i), Ci), (k), (1) (West 1990).
155. Mattco Forge, Inc. et al v. Arthur Young & Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 1441,273 Cal.
Rptr. 262, 268 (1990).
156. Ic
157. See Waicis v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 283, 288, 276 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1990)
(stating that the trial court should exercise its inherent powers to prevent discovery abuse).
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found in these motions that the responding party's conduct was
substantially justified.'5 8
If the judges actually made such determinations in the 117
cases (23% of the cases in the study), then the "no sanction"
result is correct. This is impossible to determine from most of the
minute orders. Regularly the judge simply said "motion
granted/sanction denied." However, if the non-imposition of the
sanction was due instead to a reluctance to grant sanctions'59 or
a desire to compromise by granting the moving party's motion but
allowing the responding party to win in the area of sanctions, then
the judge was not carrying out the mandate of the Discovery Act.
As the "Judges Breakdown" portion of this study1 "°
indicates, some judges do indeed seem reluctant to award
sanctions. 61 However, it must be emphasized that this study did
not delve into the merits of any individual sanctions requests.
Therefore, judges who appear in the study to be disinclined to
award sanctions may have coincidentally received many nonmeritorious motions for sanctions during the study period.
D. Motions In Which Sanctions Were Awarded But Reduced
A similar concern is present in the category of motions in
which sanctions were granted but the amount was significantly
reduced from the amount requested. This may be an even more
troubling problem. Because a sanction was awarded, the judge must
have found that the opposing party did not prove that his conduct
was substantially justified. Yet the judge did not award the total
sanction requested.

158. The new discovery rules make the imposition of monetary sanctions mandatory unless the
court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
159. This has been the topic of a law review article by a judge. See, Renfrew, Discovery
Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CM.P. L. REv. 264, 271 (1979).
160. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (setting forth the awarding pattern of each
of the judges analyzed).
161. See, e.g., Judge 23 on the Fast Track and Judge E on the Slow Track.
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The study reveals that many of the judges systematically reduce
the awards when they do award sanctions.162 In the subcategory
of motions in which sanctions were awarded but the amount
awarded was reduced from the amount requested, the judges
reduced 54% of the awards or granted 46% of the amount
163
requested. The average hourly rate awarded was $80 per hour.
While this may be the billing rate of some attorneys, it is far below
the average hourly rates of other attorneys bringing motions in Los
Angeles and thereby reduces the award to an amount that is not
reasonable.'" The average billing rate requested by attorneys and
presumably believed by them to be reasonable was $146 per hour,
45% more than the rate awarded. 165
If the total cost of the discovery abuser's conduct is not borne
by the abuser in the form of sanctions, then again the purpose of
harassment and delay by forcing uncompensated costs on the
opposing party has been achieved. As stated by one court:
Far more consonant with the rationale of the rule is a "'but for"

concept: If opposition to discovery efforts is not substantially justified,
the "'expenses incurred in obtaining the order" should encompass all

expenses, whenever incurred,that would not have been sustained had
the opponent conducted itself properly. '

162. The "'slugging percentages- of each judge were set forth in Part IUD of this article.
163. See supra IIB(2)(c). This is the subcategory of motions in which the amount awarded was
less than the amount requested.
164. It is interesting to note that when the judges do not reduce the amount of sanctions
requested, the attorneys have asked for less initially and are awarded more. ($122). See supra notes
52-55 and accompanying text. This is the subcategory of motions in which the amount awarded
equalled the amount requested.
165. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. This is the subcategory of motions in

which the amount awarded was less than the amount requested.
166. Aerway Laboratories v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 563, 565-6, (1981) (emphasis
added) (construing F.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) which served as a model for the California discovery sanction
provisions).
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While there is no "correct amount"'' 67 for a monetary
sanction, it must be enough to compensate the moving party fully
for the costs occasioned by the other side's unjustified conduct. In
deciding how much to award as a sanction, the judge has virtually
unlimited discretion. The sanction (or lack thereof) is subject to
reversal only when "arbitrary, capricious or whimsical" and "will
be upheld if it is based on a reasoned judgment and complies with
the legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter
at issue." 1 68
One appellate court has fashioned a two-part test for the
imposition and the amount of sanctions. In In re Marriage of
Milas, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that:
(1) The evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the amount
of sanctions... reflects the amount spent or incurred by [the moving

party] in an attempt to obtain compliance with discovery, and (2) the
record must reflect a determination by the trial court that such amount
spent or incurred was reasonable. 16

Therefore, the judges in the study who reduced the amount
requested by the moving party in 130 sanctions awards should have
found either that the amounts specified in the swdrn declarations
of the attorneys were false or that the amounts were unreasonable.
Again, the minute orders reviewed for this study do not reflect
whether such determinations were made.
If the judges reduced the sanction amounts because they
actually found that the attorney was untruthful or that the amount
was unreasonable, then the reduction was justified. If, however, the
reduction was made because of an inclination to compromise or to
give the responding attorney "a slap on the hand" without making

167. There is no limitation on the amount of a sanction under the Discovery Act. Caldwcll v.
Samuels Jewelers, 222 Cal. App. 3d 970, 272 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1990). Compare Mattco Forge, Inc.,
et al v. Arthur Young & Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 1437,273 Cal. Rptr. 262,265, (1990) (holding
a sanction of $750 was found to be "fair and legally correct's) with In Re Marriage of Niklas, 211
Cal. App. 3d 28, 38, 258 Cal. Rptr. 921, 927 (1989) (holding an award of $45,000 not to be

excessive).
168.
(1990)
169.

In Re Marriage of Economu, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1466, 1475-76, 274 Cal. Rptr. 473, 478
In Re Marriage of Niklas, 211 Cal. App. 3d 28, 38, 258 Cal. Rptr. 921, 927 (1989).
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him absorb the full costs of his unjustified170 conduct, then the
reduction defeats the purpose of the Discovery Act.
It would be surprising if attorney untruthfulness was the reason
for the reduction. Attorneys must submit their itemized sanctions
requests indeclarations under penalty of perjury. Such itemization
of costs and attorney's fees under penalty of perjury has been held
t7 1
to constitute sufficient proof for the court to award sanctions.
If a judge believed an attorney was untruthful in a sworn
declaration, one would expect the judge to do something other than
merely reduce the amount of a requested sanction without
comment.
In all probability, the judges who reduced the sanctions requests
thought the amounts requested were unreasonable. While the
Discovery Act specifically calls for the imposition of sanctions in
an amount that is reasonable,172 what is reasonable is difficult to
determine.
One problem in the area of the proper dollar amount of
sanctions arises because the 1986 Code revisions fail to address the
issue.' 73 The Act does not define "reasonable expenses." One
commentator has argued that this failure to give more direction
could possibly render the monetary sanction provisions of the
Discovery Act "just another paper tiger." 1 74 Others suggest that
practitioners call the court clerk to find out the "going rate" and
draft moving papers with that in mind.175
Perhaps also adding to a judge's inclination to reduce the
amount of monetary sanctions is the recently amended Code of

170.

The award of some sanctions precludes the argument that the conduct was substantially

justified.
171. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d 289, 324,271 Cal. Rptr. 470,490 (1990).
172. Section 2023(b)(1) provides that: "The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering
that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process... pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1)

(West 1990).
173. The code's only guidance is that the amount paid should be the "reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees." Id.
174. Donovan, Sanctions Under the Civil Discovery Act of 1986, Section 2023: Will it Make
a Difference or Is It JustAnother "Paper Tiger,"'? 15 PEPP. L REV. 401 (1988).
175. Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Chap. 8
Discovery, 8:1189, p. 8F-65 (1990).
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Civil Procedure section 904.1, which allows appeals of orders for
monetary sanctions that exceed $750.176
E. Exemplary Sanction Procedures
One hundred forty or 27% of the sanction awards in the study
were noteworthy in that the award exactly equalled the amount
requested by the moving party. Assuming the judges were not
merely "rubber-stamping" the request, these awards can be
attributed to attorneys whose requests were reasonable and to the
judges with the highest "slugging percentages" who demonstrated
a willingness to grant the amount the moving attorney said had
been incurred. When the discovery misconduct was proven, these
judges found the sworn declaration of the attorney as to his
expenses to be both believable and reasonable. This category of
cases indicates a judicial willingness to award the moving attorneys
their full expenses of bringing the motion as a means to prevent
discovery abuse. In these cases the purpose of the sanction
provisions of the Discovery Act was fully achieved by shifting the
total cost of the discovery abuse to the losing party. This is the
way the sanctioning power of the court is intended to work.
Unfortunately, because of a probable combination of attorneys
bringing non-meritorious motions for sanctions, judges not
awarding sanctions when they should, attorneys asking for
unreasonable amounts of sanctions, and judges awarding
unreasonably low sanctions, in 73% of the motions for sanctions
examined by this study, the sanctions procedures did not operate
optimally.

176. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 1990). Section 904.1 was amended in 1989 to
include sub-section (k) as a situation where an appeal, rather than a petition for an extraordinary writ,
is proper
(k) From a superior court judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party
or An attorney for a party only if the amount exceeds seven hundred fifty dollars ($750).
Lesser sanction judgments against a party or an attorney for a party may be reviewed on
an appeal by that party after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the
discretion of the court of appeal, may be reviewed upon petition for an extraordinary writ.
Id § 904.1(k) (West 1990).
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F. Suggestion As To Amount Of Sanctions To Be Awarded
It is apparent from the study that judges are not consistent in
their interpretation of what amounts to "reasonable" expenses and
attorney fees. While an individual judge may have a "going rate"
in mind, certainly one judge's perception may not be shared by his
colleagues. Perhaps a workable alternative to inconsistent
interpretations of reasonableness could be solved by the
establishment of two local court rules.
One proposed rule would require attorneys to specify in their
declarations the exact number of hours expended because of the
alleged abuse and a detailed description of the work performed. A
local Law and Discovery rule presently requires attorneys seeking
sanctions to present a declaration "detailing the calculation of the
amount sought." 177 However, this rule has not gone far enough
to elicit a comprehensive breakdown of attorneys' time. In 19% of
the motions for sanctions, the attorneys did not differentiate
between fees and costs and specify the total number of hours
expended.178 Although attorneys were usually more successful
when they specified billable hours and fees, the failure to do so did
not result in an automatic denial of sanctions.179 The rule should
be redrafted to clarify that hours expended, total fees requested,
and costs requested should be designated.
Once this is accomplished, the judges can examine the
declarations to determine whether the hours expended and work
performed were reasonable. It is in this area that the judge should
exercise discretion.
However, the hourly rate awarded by the judge when the need
for sanctions is evident should not be discretionary. Thus, a second
local rule should establish the hourly rate to be awarded. The rule
could adopt either one set hourly rate or a fee schedule based on
the number of years of experience of the attorney. The judge would

177. Law and Discovery Policy Manual, Rule IVD paragraph 256, p. 34 (1990).
178. See supra page 18 (specifying that in ninety-six cases the attorneys did not specify the
hours expended or differentiate fees from costs).
179. See supra notes 44-64 (discussing the cases in which attorneys differentiated between fees
and costs and also cases in which they did not differentiate between fees and costs).
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then apply this non-discretionary hourly rate to the hours
determined by the judge in his discretion to have been expended by
the moving party as a result of the sanctioned parties' abusive
conduct. In this way a judge's discretion is preserved where it is
important and sanction awards would become more consistent and
better suited to deter abuse.

